



SUDAN STUDIES

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SUDAN STUDIES SOCIETY OF THE UK

The Sudan Studies Society of the UK was founded in 1986 to encourage and promote Sudanese studies in the United Kingdom and abroad, at all levels and in all disciplines. SSSUK is a registered charity (no. 328272).

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Membership:

Anyone with an interest in the Sudan, general or specialized, is welcome to join the SSSUK. Membership is by annual subscription payable in January each year. Current subscription rates are:

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EDITORIAL

2011 has been a momentous year for Sudan with the referendum in the South that has led to the division of the country into two separate states. The Republic of South Sudan was born on 9 July 2011 with appropriate celebrations in Juba, its new capital, and throughout the rest of that country. Unfortunately, there are still matters to be decided not least the status of Abyei and other matters relating to the oil industry. We send our best wishes to both parts of what was until recently a single international political entity and trust that both parts will co-operate together in mutual respect, because they will both need each other in the future.

We are fortunate in that our Chairperson, **Douglas Johnson**, was an official guest for the **Independence Day** celebrations in Juba and so this issue begins with his account of the day's events and is followed by two pictures relating to the Referendum earlier in the year.

The emergence of the Republic of South Sudan has wider implications for the African continent. There has been general agreement that, in spite of all their shortcomings, the boundaries left by colonial rulers should be maintained. Clearly, the division of Sudan could have repercussions in other countries with separatist movements.

The emergence of two states replacing the old Sudan raises questions for SSSUK as to its future remit and this will no doubt be discussed at the forthcoming AGM. 2011 is also a significant year for the SSSUK as it marks our **Silver Jubilee**. Yes, the Society was founded 25 year ago. In celebration of this we include a short history of the achievements of the Society compiled by one of the original founding group, **Peter Woodward**.

As befits the present political situation our first main paper by **Moritz Mihatsch**, a PhD student at Nuffield College, Oxford, looks at comparisons between the '**Independences**' of 1956 and 2011.

Our second article is very different and, as far as I can ascertain, covers new ground for *Sudan Studies*. **Zoe Cormack**, a PhD student at Durham University, discusses dance in Dinka Districts of Sudan during the Condominium. She is currently spending a year of fieldwork in the Rumbek area of the new South Sudan, and asks **anyone with an interest in the subject of Dance in the Sudan to make contact via her e-mail address ztcormack@gmail.com**

The other two papers relate to the Butana. The first, by **Khalid M Mustafa Aburaïda** of the Disaster Management and Refugees Studies Institute (DIMARSI) in Khartoum, is about the importance of **remittances in farming** in the Gedaref area. The second is about conflict between **agriculturists and pastoralists** in areas east of Rufa'a, and is by **Sameer Alredaisy** of the Education Faculty of Khartoum University in Omdurman and **Abdel Aziem Tinier** from Gezira University. Though the research was carried out some 10 years ago the conclusions are probably even more relevant to-day than they were then.

We also have three book reviews. In *Sudan Studies* 37 Mary Keenan wrote about a **botanical expedition** to the Sudan. Since then Mary has gone on to expand what she wrote into a book which is reviewed in this issue. Derek Welsby's book about **Sudan's first railway** is reviewed by **Henry Gunston** who has written about similar railways elsewhere in Africa. The third book is about the current situation in the **Nuba Mountains** and is reviewed by **Wendy James**, Emeritus Professor of Anthropology of Oxford University. Wendy was awarded a CBE in the Queen's Birthday Honours List and we send her our congratulations.

SSSUK AGM AND SYMPOSIUM WILL BE HELD ON
24 SEPTEMBER 2011.

Make every effort to attend as this is likely to be quite a momentous occasion. Not only have there been momentous developments politically in the Sudan, but also 2011 marks the Silver Jubilee of the SSSUK. As ever, the meeting will take place in the School of Oriental and African Studies in London.

(For further details please refer to SSSUK Notices, our web site and flyer enclosed).

SUBSCRIPTIONS

May we once again remind members who have not paid for 2011 that subscriptions were due on 1st January. Please pay **NOW** if you have not already done so – by cheque to the Treasurer, Adrian Thomas (see address inside front cover) or directly to the Society's account:

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INDEPENDENCE DAY, JUBA, 9 JULY 2011

Douglas H. Johnson

Juba is nearly unrecognizable from the city I left in 1983, when the war had started, the Southern Region had been dissolved by presidential decree, and we were told to return to our home regions. It is even nearly unrecognizable from the city I first returned to in 2006. My perspective, therefore, is different from the jaded, world-weary, Afro-pessimistic international press corps who came to Juba for the first time, talked mainly to the foreign NGOs, and ticked off what it does *not* have. I, on the other hand, compare what it now has – and what South Sudan as a new nation now has – that it did not have some thirty-eight years ago when it was a part of a united Sudan, supposedly at peace with itself. Both lists – what is still lacking after fifty-six years of unity, and what has been gained during twenty-two years of civil war and six years of an interim period – are reminders why the outcome of the referendum was a foregone conclusion.

The signs at the airport, along the roads, and on the walls and buildings left all visitors in no doubt about what was to come. Congratulations from corporations, political parties and civil society groups. Lengthy explanations: *'We were oppressed together and now we will be free together'*, *'It took bullets and ballots to obtain freedom'* (this from the SPLA), *'A New Dawn'*, and, repeated over and over again, *'Free at last!'*

Independence came at midnight on the morning of 9 July when the interim period of the CPA expired, and was formally celebrated in the heat of the afternoon the same day. A concrete grandstand had been constructed in front of the John Garang Mausoleum, facing a row of flagpoles across the road bearing the flags of the community of nations, behind which temporary

awnings and chairs had been set up facing the grandstand. Obtaining a pass as a foreign invited guest took the better part of two days, with no clear indication of where invited guests were to sit. After being shooed out of the shaded area reserved for members of parliament I was directed to the unshaded section of the grandstand. The office issuing my pass were not quite sure of my nationality so, rather than identifying me as either American or British, I was registered as South Sudanese, and was so identified on the guest pass hanging around my neck. This meant that I was almost denied access to the foreign guest section and redirected towards the section for other South Sudanese. I finally managed to get a seat on the edge of a block of *khawaja* NGOs, adjacent to the section reserved for the SPLA generals, who eventually arrived in dress uniforms, leading the audience in the singing of popular SPLA songs (the simplest being *'Never, never, never, never, never, surrender, surrender, surrender, surrender'*).

There were not enough seats for either the Sudanese or the foreign guests. An appeal was made over the public address system for the MPs to vacate their seats for the visitors, but they would not budge. Another appeal went out to the generals to give up their seats, and being soldiers used to giving and obeying commands many of them did so. My new neighbours were a Kenyan Luo and a Ugandan Karimojong. We compared notes about common vocabulary between their native languages and those of South Sudanese and it soon became clear that to them South Sudan represented a missing piece in East Africa's historical jigsaw puzzle. *'This is where we came from'*, they told me, *'this is our homeland'*.

The formal celebrations started a good two hours late, after the formal reception of a succession of foreign delegations. Thirty African countries were represented, with at least seventeen heads of state. Kenya sent Moi, Kibaki, Odinga, Kipligat, and Barrack Obama's step-grandmother. Kenneth Kaunda, the last surviving member of Africa's first generation of independence

leaders, came on his own (the Zambian delegation would not allow him on their plane). Museveni got the loudest cheer from the audience – which by that time had swollen to anywhere from 150,000 to 250,000 – most of them patiently standing in the sun. Perhaps the most surprising inclusion was the President of Somaliland, head of the only functioning government in what was once Somalia, and still unrecognized by the rest of the world. By holding the referendum even when some voices advocated circumventing it with a straight declaration of independence South Sudan got its recognition, and the world came to Juba on 9 July.

Any Sudanese present witnessing the formalities of the celebration and the audience reaction when the old flag was lowered and the new flag raised on an immensely tall flagpole, would have been left in no doubt that South Sudanese independence is now irrevocable and irreversible. And it is probably for this reason that the leaders of the main northern Sudanese opposition parties had been invited and were present: both wings of the Umma Party, the DUP, the Communists, and even Turabi. These parties in the past have been in the habit of repudiating agreements with the South made when they were in opposition. By their presence on Saturday they were made complicit in South Sudan's independence, their thumbprints, in effect, have been added as witness signatures to the document.

There were, of course, speeches from select dignitaries as well as Riek Machar, Bashir, and Salva Kirr. The president of Equatorial Guinea (that noted democrat!) spoke in Spanish on behalf of the African Union. His references to 'Sudan del Sud' were correctly translated as 'South Sudan', but his references to 'Sudan del norte' were merely translated as 'Sudan'. Meles Zenawi's speech should have been a model for all other speakers, if they wished to show their empathy with the audience in the sun: ninety seconds long, he congratulated South Sudanese and announced Ethiopia's recognition of the new nation. Britain's Foreign Secretary, William Hague, was

not on the original list of speakers, but he, too, was much appreciated. Not as compact as Meles, he was still to the point, not only recognizing the new nation, but announcing that Britain had now opened an embassy in Juba and had already appointed an ambassador, the first country to do so.

It was, of course, Salva Kiir's speech, the final one in a long list, which was the most important. It was more a State of the Union speech, listing what the government of the newly independent nation knew it had to do, and hoped to do. By addressing the South Sudanese public, rather than only members of parliament, the President in effect was inviting the citizens of the nation to hold him accountable. There was no minimizing the challenges they faced. There was no glossing over the suffering South Sudanese had experienced during the war, nor the fact that some of this suffering was inflicted by themselves. *'We will forgive'*, he promised, *'but we will not forget'*. And finally, addressing the people of Abyei, Blue Nile, South Kordofan and Darfur, he promised not to forget them either. *'When you cry, we cry. When you bleed, we also bleed'*, and pledged to work to find a resolution to these crises.

At the end of the day, after nine and a half hours in the sun (by my still ticking, but very damp wristwatch), and after a cold shower and an even colder beer, I realized the full significance of the event. In addition to resolving Sudan's longest-running conflict, this is the first time that an African people have been allowed to VOTE for their independence. All of Britain's former African territories obtained their independence by *negotiation* with the colonial power, not by popular vote. Sudan evaded an independence plebiscite in 1955 when its parliament declared independence. This is another reason why this day, 9 July 2011 was so very very special.

SOUTH SUDAN REFERENDUM, 2011



Counting the Votes



Celebrating the Results

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SSSUK AT 25

Peter Woodward

It was flattering to be asked to write a piece on the occasion of SSSUK's 25th anniversary. I suspect it may have been because it was thought that I have more of the institutional memory than anybody else, and it will be largely from memory. I think some of the early papers are in the Sudan Archives in Durham, but this brief article will be impressionistic with help from *Sudan Studies*.

WHY SSSUK IN 1986?

Two reasons come to mind. First, the Anglo-Sudanese Association was dying out - literally since the bulk of its British membership was comprised of former officials in Sudan with whom time was catching up. It had been largely social interspersed with occasional talks, and it seemed to a small group of us that a new society would make a fresh start based around the more recent British links with Sudan in fields such as education and NGO work. However, we were delighted that a number of former officials joined the new society including Robin Hodgkin, who represented the Sudan Pensioners' Association for many years, John Udal, who was working on his two volume 'opus' on the Nile, and Philip Bowcock who has made a major contribution throughout our 25 years (I well remember the joy and astonishment of a group of Nuer in Khartoum in 2006 when Philip chatted with them in their own tongue). Philip handled the handover from the Anglo-Sudanese Society when it was finally wound up and its assets transferred to SSSUK and the Sudan Archive at Durham University.

The second main reason that I recall was the founding of the Sudan Studies Association (SSA) in the USA in the mid-1980s. Surely, if US-based academics could set up a society focussing on Sudan then Britain should have one too? At our first annual meeting Martin Daly (an American of course) gave a mildly critical presentation about the Sudan Political Service which one former official remarked had '*got us off to a bad start*', though it was not a view shared by many I am glad to say.



As for the name SSSUK, it seemed to Lesley Forbes, Sandy Sanderson, Tony Trilsbach and myself when we met to set up the society in Durham that we should first choose our acronym: enough said.

MEMBERSHIP

SSSUK started in a small way with our meeting in Durham but took off rapidly. A mail shot of over 1,000 people elicited replies from 200 and by 1987 there were 300 members. In the early 1990s it started to decline and fell to 180, a figure around which it has roughly stabilised. The character of the members somewhat reflects the changing times. Naturally, the number of former officials fell away in time, but there was still a steady recruitment of former teachers and NGO staff who had contracted 'Sudanitis' to a greater or lesser degree. The VSOs of my generation were succeeded by the English language programme, run for much of the 1970s and '80s from the Sudan Cultural Centre, and for many years by one of SSSUK's secretaries, Simon Bush. The arrival of the *Ingaz* regime in 1989 curtailed English language teaching for some years, but in time the Sudan Volunteer Programme (SVP) emerged involving another SSSUK stalwart, David Wolton, and became another source of members. In addition, the travails of the country attracted a steady interest from journalists and researchers who formed a further channel for recruitment. It has also been encouraging to see the number of researchers around the world who have become members.

The interest of Sudanese in UK was somewhat slow initially, not least because there were a number of groups of their own such as that of the many medical doctors working here. However, in the 1990s their active numbers rose partly for the most regrettable of reasons, namely the arrival of the *Ingaz* and the repression the regime attempted not only in the South, where conflict intensified, but also in the North as it sought to impose its Islamic hegemony across the whole of the country. Numerous Sudanese and their families sought refuge here and helping them gain asylum became almost a pocket industry for one or two SSSUK members. A number joined SSSUK and their

presence helped to keep alive an understanding of what was happening at a time when access for many outsiders, including me, was deliberately restricted. This situation with regard to much of the country appeared to be easing after 2000 as war in the south slowly decreased, only for there to be another spurt with the Darfur crisis. One reflection of the greater involvement of Sudanese has been the acceptance of the presidency of SSSUK by Sudan's best known novelist, the late Tayeb Saleh, and now by the acclaimed calligrapher, Ibrahim El-Salahi: SSSUK has also welcomed its first Sudanese chair, Anisa Dani.

I cannot end this section without acknowledging the years of work by successive secretaries and treasurers (editors come later). There have been too many to list here (see below), and it would be invidious to select, but they have really borne the brunt of keeping the society alive and deserve our thanks and help when needed. Being chair was easy compared with all the work they put in.¹

ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM

Central to SSSUK's life has been the annual symposium, which after briefly being held in the spring, has had an established position in the diaries of members in early autumn. For reasons of maximum attendance it has always been in London, but the capital raises the problem of cost and as a result the symposium had for years a somewhat peripatetic life. Early meetings were generously hosted by the Sudan Cultural Centre in a rather grand address in Rutland Gate. Those who remember it will recall that the address was grander than the centre's interior, though the latter had a certain Sudanese piquancy. Also what had once been a London town house for the well-to-do was not ideal for accommodating the numbers who attended and people were often strewn around passage ways and staircases. Apart from the character of the facilities, the arrival of the *Ingaz* meant that there were justifiable fears that it was no longer an appropriate location and the search for a new venue was on. Over the following years the quest for an affordable hall for the coming year was always something of a headache and SSSUK worked its way

through a number of locations, including London House, part of the University of London, and Friends' House in nearby Euston Road. The School of Oriental and African Studies seemed beyond SSSUK's pocket for some while but in time became the longest serving venue, especially when we gained free access through the School's relationship with the Royal African Society.

The order and content of the symposia have changed little over the years. It has always been the case that SSSUK has tried to focus on a range of interests in Sudan from archaeology to zoology and each year as varied a programme as possible has been arranged. One engaging feature for several years was John Wright demonstrating his simple solar cooker - a kind of open basket lined with silver foil which could work even in Britain - it seemed such a simple and effective idea. Down the years there have been many memorable presentations, and not a few of them have found their way into *Sudan Studies*. Naturally, there have been heightened tensions on occasion since 1989, but these have been few and far between and no great schisms have taken place. The symposium always includes a most enjoyable Sudanese lunch, for which many thanks to the excellent cooks.

One disappointment has been the problem of holding meetings outside London. The subject has come up regularly at AGMs and in the committee but there has been no obvious answer. To take the Annual Symposium outside London would probably reduce numbers significantly, and yet there has long been a sense that more should be done elsewhere. In practice the most common route out of the capital has been the opportunities for SSSUK members to participate in Sudan oriented activities in other centres including in recent years Oxford, Manchester, Leeds and Edinburgh to name but a few.

SUDAN STUDIES

The newsletter has always been something between a newsletter and a journal, more informed than the former and more reader friendly than some of the latter. Looking back through it turned out to be the most enjoyable part of writing this piece and my memory was constantly

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jogged. Like the symposium presentations it has a pleasingly wide range of material, and it was notable how little of it seemed dated. Indeed on occasions it seemed notably prescient: one example was a substantial article from James Morton which appeared in 1992 discussing the conflict in Darfur and entitled, 'Tribal Administration or no administration: the choice in Western Sudan'. Two years later Albaghir Mukhtar contributed an article on 'The unity of Sudan: the fading hope' in which he wrote, '*The first question is: will Sudan remain united? The answer is no*' (No.16). SS has also reflected the more attractive side of Sudan, including its rich artistic and cultural heritage: the very first number even included an article by Jack Davies on the stamps of the Sudan. Maintaining its tradition for variety has probably been helped by the long service of the editors, with just four in 25 years, and SSSUK has much for which to thank Tony Trilsbach (who combined it with being secretary), Paul Wilson, Justin Willis and Jack Davies. Sadly, the number of obituaries of people associated with research and writing on Sudan has increased in recent years, but such is the passing of time and a generation of Sudanese and expatriates who did so much to establish the foundations that contributed *inter alia* to the building of SSSUK.

INTERNATIONAL SUDAN STUDIES MEETINGS

One regular subject at committee meetings has been the location of the next international Sudan studies conference. *Sudan in Africa*, edited by Yusuf Fadl Hasan in 1968 (Khartoum UP), describes itself as the studies presented at the first international conference, sponsored by The Sudan Research Unit (SRU), but the series to which I refer began 20 years later and was also first held in Khartoum, hosted by the Institute of African and Asian Studies (IAAS) which had by then grown from the SRU. That 1988 meeting was addressed by no less a personage than the then prime minister, Sadiq al-Mahdi.

The series, which has continued on a triennial basis ever since, has centred on the collaboration of IAAS with SSA and SSSUK. It has all been very informal and has largely been a matter of finding a host university that would not only make the necessary arrangements but



be responsible for the programme. By my count there have now been eight such conferences which have had a wide spread of locations (academic tourism as it is known in my house!). In addition to Khartoum, the conference has been held in Boston, Cairo, Washington, Bergen, Pretoria and Durham. Durham, with its acclaimed Sudan Archive founded by Richard Hill who contributed so much, starting with his days on Sudan Railways before World War II (can there be an archive to match it outside the continent on any single sub-Saharan African country), is the only university to have hosted it twice and has proved outstanding on both occasions. The search is still on for the next willing university, but I am sure that wherever it may be it will prove an enjoyable as well as an informative occasion: it will be the first to face the issue of two countries rather than just one. Altogether the series has been a great success bringing together participants from all round the world. Perhaps the only regrettable note has been the inability to return to Sudan: conditions for academic work have led many to feel for a number of years that they could not contribute there as they would wish.

SSSUK can congratulate itself on having lasted as well as it has done for the past quarter of a century. It now faces a new challenge as The Republic of South Sudan is established, inevitably requiring the society to re-define itself. Francis Deng long hoped for '*one country, two systems*'; perhaps for the foreseeable future for SSSUK it will be '*one society, two countries*'.

¹ For the record, and if I have counted correctly, we have had the following (all honorary)- apologies if I have missed anybody out:

Presidents: Sir Gawain Bell; Professor G N Sanderson; Tayeb Saleh; and Ibrahim El-Salahi.

Chairs: Neville Sanderson; Joan Hall; David Lindley; Peter Woodward; Gill Lusk; Anisa Dani; and Douglas Johnson.

Secretaries: Tony Trilsbach; Simon Bush; Alan Kunna; Richard Brook; Aliya Mahmoud; Zaki El-Hassan; and Gill Lusk.

Treasurers: Lesley Forbes; David Lindley; Adrian Thomas.

Editors: Tony Trilsbach; Paul Wilson; Justin Willis; Jack Davies.



SUDANESE INDEPENDENCIES 1956 AND 2011

Will history repeat itself?

Moritz Mihatsch

On 7th February 2011 a historical event took place; the 14th day of the Egyptian uprising, 1,600 kilometers south of Cairo, barely noticed by the global audience, the final results of the Southern Sudanese referendum were announced. News media can be cruel. The results showed a clear preference of Southern Sudanese for independence. In consequence on 9th July 2011 South Sudan will become a fully independent state and with the independence of South Sudan the colonial borders of African states will be changed for the first time. South Sudan will be the first newly independent state in Africa since Eritrea in 1993.

2011 will see the second Sudanese independence; the first being in 1956. The fact that a second Sudanese independence will occur at all is a clear indicator that the first was not all that successful. This paper will revisit the events which led to Sudanese independence in 1956, and argues that independence in 1956 was mostly the result of some meddling and some provokingly complicated bureaucratic processes. Therefore there was neither a clear movement to carry independence, nor was there a clear national narrative. The lack of a unified movement and the lack of a national narrative resulted in a situation where the newly independent Sudan had practically no basis for any sort of nation building.

The events of 2011 are at least in part a result of that failed nation building, but in a worrying twist of the historical development certain parallels between 1956 and 2011 become apparent and there could be a risk that South Sudan repeats in 2011 the mistakes of Sudan in 1956. This paper will first discuss the different strands of events which led to Sudanese independence in 1956 and then will look at how those events relate to Sudanese nation building. The second part of the paper looks at the events which brought South Sudanese

independence in 2011. Comparisons will then be drawn between these two periods.

JUMBLED INDEPENDENCE

Sudanese independence in 1956 was a result of four partially parallel, partially intermingled struggles. By struggle is meant a confrontation of two parties which was defining for a specific historical period. The first of these struggles happened mostly until 1952 and was between the Sudanese and the British colonial state. The second struggle peaked in late 1952 and took place between the British Empire and the Egyptian state. The third struggle rose to importance from early 1953, which was the struggle between the Sudanese and the Egyptian forces over unity. Lastly, all these struggles were mirrored in a struggle between different groups within the Sudanese nationalist elite.

From 'cheap' rule to 'self' rule

With the end of the Second World War and the Truman doctrine in place the British became growingly aware that their colonial empire would not last forever. Pushed by people under colonial rule, some groups within Britain and the Americans they started to rethink their policies. Simultaneously, the immediate lack of resources forced the adoption of ruling by the cheap and that meant ruling through the ruled themselves. All of these processes meant that the Sudan Political Service partially forced by circumstances, partially on their own accord and mostly due to pressure from London implemented more and more elaborate structures of self rule for the Sudanese.

As Gaafar Bakhit points out in his thesis, it was with the arrival of Sir George Stewart Symes as Governor General in 1934 that the British administration in Sudan began to reassess its co-operation with the local elites and began to work with the Sudanese intelligentsia instead of working with the tribal leaders. With the active encouragement of the administration the Sudanese intelligentsia formed the Graduates' General Congress in 1938. Bakhit argues that Symes and his administration followed this policy to prevent an anti-government

coalition between the neo-mahdists and the intelligentsia and to strengthen the moderate element within the graduate grouping. However by doing so, they aided the start of a nationalist political organization.^[1]

In 1942 more progressive forces around the leadership of Ismā'il al-Azharī, one of the most prominent political figures of this period, succeeded in taking over control within the Congress and as a result they put a memorandum to the Governor General demanding, among other things, self-determination directly after the end of the war and the formation of a representative body to give certain administrative powers to the Sudanese. The direct reaction of the British to the memorandum was negative but, nevertheless, in 1943 a commission was formed to study possibilities for better representation of Sudanese and by 1944 the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan was formed.^[2]

The Aṣīqqā, that is the political grouping around Ismā'il al-Azharī, and their partners in the Khatmīya brotherhood – one of the two most important Sufi groupings in Sudan at the time – decided not to participate in the Advisory Council. They argued that it was not sufficient and they argued that those who did participate were collaborating with the British. The political grouping aligned with the Ansār – the other important Sufi grouping – and their leader Sayyid Abd-al-Raḥman al-Mahdī argued for a gradual process through the constitutional tools and participated. From 1945 onwards the Egyptians and the British attempted to renegotiate their treaties regarding Sudan. After this attempt failed, the Egyptians took the case to the United Nations Security Council but the Council failed to find a solution. Mohamed Omar Baṣṣir argues that as a reaction to the failed revision of Sudan's legal status, the British pushed the internal constitutional development and in consequence the Legislative Assembly was created in 1948.^[3]

The Legislative Assembly was the first elected assembly in which Sudanese were represented. But again, the Aṣīqqā believed that this was not going anywhere and that it was 'too little, too late' and

abstained. The Umma Party, formed mostly by key members of the Ansār of Sayyid Abd-al-Rahman al-Mahdī, participated in the elections and won most of the seats. As David Sconyers argued, the Sudan Political Service attempted to outmanoeuvre the Egyptians and slowly moved towards a *"transition [of the Sudan] to self-rule [under] pro-British Umma Party rule."* But this attempt was overseen by an unimaginative, overworked and undermanned administration.^[4]

The Free Officers enter the scene

On July 26th 1952 something unexpected changed the situation completely; the Egyptian monarchy was overthrown by a group of young officers, who for the time being put the more senior General Alī Muhammad Nagīb, who was half-Egyptian and half-Sudanese, as a leader of their revolution. The chaotic post revolution days left little time to ponder anything which was not an absolute top priority. In consequence, when Husain Dū-al-Faqār Sabrī, an Egyptian officer stationed in Khartoum at the time of the Egyptian revolution, as he recalls in his autobiography, tried to get the Free Officers' attention to what was happening in Sudan they basically delegated the issue to him.^[5]

The struggle between the British and the Egyptians had of course existed before. Basically, the Egyptians claimed that Sudan was a natural part of their dominion and that once the British would leave the country, it should return fully to Egypt. The British however, already having their share of troubles with Egypt, preferred a non-Egyptian controlled and pro-British Sudan. The problem was that the British had used the Egyptian claim to the Sudan as an excuse to invade the country, defeat the Mahdī and extend their dominion in the first place. The unique status of the Sudan as a Condominium was a result of this excuse and the Condominium status was the root of the Anglo-Egyptian conflict over who should rule Sudan.^[6]

In November 1950 the Egyptians had announced that they would abrogate the Condominium agreement. As a result the British instituted a constitutional commission to redefine the Sudan's legal status. Based on certain findings of the commission, the Governor

General proposed the Self-Government Statute in May 1952. This statute would have given the Sudanese more rights, but at the same time eliminated the last Egyptian checks and balances. The submitted statute also proclaimed a deadline for November 1952 to make counter-suggestions, otherwise it would automatically go into effect.

This was the situation Sabrī encountered when he was tasked by Salāh Sālim, one of the Free Officers in Cairo, to deal with the situation and, because of the unilateral deadline, he had to deal with it quickly. The Egyptians realized that they needed the support of the Sudanese for any counter-suggestion and to get their support they had to offer them more than what the British offered with the statute. After various talks Sabrī resolved that the only solution would be to offer the Sudanese true self-determination after a fixed and short transitional period. With this offer the Egyptians would get the Sudanese support for amendments they considered necessary to dismantle the British influence in Sudan.^[7]

In November 1952 the Egyptians made their appeal and less than a fortnight later the Egyptians and the British began their talks in Cairo. When the talks came to a standstill it was Salāh Sālim who travelled to Sudan to rally Sudanese support for the Egyptian demands. During this trip occurred the famous incident, when he danced in underwear with a group of Dinka, thanks to which Sālim will ever be remembered as the dancing major in Sudan. As a result of Sālim's success the talks were immediately resumed and after another month of negotiations the two parties finally signed the Anglo-Egyptian agreement.

Between separation and independence

As a result of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1953 the Sudanese elected a parliament in late 1953. This parliament would navigate the country through the transitional period. In this period the government was tasked to create a neutral atmosphere for the Sudanese to freely decide on the question of unity with or separation from Egypt. During this period the role of the British was diminishing, while the role of Egypt became increasingly important; mostly because of the personal



involvement of Major Salāh Sālim and his readiness to conduct chequebook diplomacy. Sālim's great attention to the Sudanese question was mostly due to his attempt to distinguish himself among the Free Officers by attaining the unity of the Nile Valley for Egypt.

The Egyptians did everything they could to ensure that the National Unionist Party (NUP), which as the name indicates supported unity with Egypt, would win the elections of 1953. The eventual victory of the NUP was partially a result of this Egyptian support but also due to other factors such as bad organization on the side of the Umma Party. The British were convinced that now they had lost the Sudan to Egypt. It is one of the ironies of history that the Sudan achieved its full independence under the leadership of a party which officially fought for the "*Unity of the Nile Valley*."

The reasons for this are fourfold. First of all, with the removal of Alī Muhammad Nagīb from power in Egypt on February 25th 1954 and then his final dismissal in November of the same year, the most popular figure of the Free Officers in Sudan disappeared. In the same period Gamāl Abd-al-Nāssir became increasingly hostile to the Muslim Brotherhood and it became more and more apparent that the regime in Egypt was not going to govern democratically. All this made union with Egypt less attractive for a large part of Sudanese society, including the educated elites.^[8]

Second, the Umma Party ran a campaign against the idea of unity with Egypt by organizing demonstrations all around the country, which created a credible threat to al-Azharī who was now Prime Minister of the Sudan.^[9] Third, the position of al-Azharī and other members of his party had always been ambivalent on the extent and shape of union with Egypt and at least for a part of his party to support union with Egypt was a tactical decision directed against the British.^[10] Once it was clear that the British would leave, Egyptian support was not necessary any longer. Fourth and last, there is reason to argue that Nāssir was himself not a great supporter of unity and that he was not unhappy to see the Sudan become independent and with that to weaken the position of Salāh Sālim.^[11] Thanks to these four

factors the pendulum eventually swung towards full independence, which brought this chapter of the Sudanese/Egyptian relationship to an end.

The internal divisions

The struggles between the Sudanese, the British and the Egyptians were always also mirrored as a conflict between different groups and parties in Sudan. Certain of these conflicts were rooted historically, some were tactical and others were ideological. Basically, one can distinguish three different groups: the first was the Ansār brotherhood and Umma Party linked to Sayyid Abd-al-Raḥman al-Mahdī; the second group was the Khatmīya brotherhood linked to Sayyid Alī al-Mīrḡanī; and the third was the Aṣīqqā under the leadership of Ismāīl al-Azharī.

The two Sayyids, as the British called them, competed over religious predominance and political influence. But most importantly, the leaders of the Khatmīya brotherhood who were not ready to accept the claim of Sayyid Abd-al-Rahman's father to be the Mahdī had gone into exile to Egypt when the Mahdī started his war against the Turkish-Egyptian occupation in the late 19th century. They only returned when the British defeated the Mahdī's forces to find their mosques and holy places destroyed. In consequence, the two groups continually considered each other as enemies.^[12]

The antipathy between the Aṣīqqā and the brotherhoods, especially with the Ansār, was mostly an ideological one. The Aṣīqqā believed that their members, i.e. young, modern-educated, urban elites should run the Sudan after independence.^[13] The brotherhoods, however, believed in a more conservative approach to power. From their perspective power naturally came from the hands of the religious leader of the brotherhood, especially with the Ansār, who had a clear political calling and proposed a political system highly centred on Sayyid Abd-al-Rahman al-Mahdī.^[14]

While Sayyid Abd-al-Rahman al-Mahdī aligned himself with the British for historical reasons and tried to work through the

constitutional instruments for Sudanese independence,^[15] the Ašīqqā and the Khatmīya brotherhood aligned themselves against him with the Egyptians, partially to get the Egyptian financial backing. This division which was motivated threefold – historically, ideologically and tactically – became so dominant that it is hindering co-operation between those groups down to today.

A second level of division which became more and more apparent was the relationship between the Northern political elites and the Southern political elites. But overall the most apparent characteristic of the Southern role in Sudanese independence was their irrelevance. The most important events in regard to the South were either when the South was spoken about such as the fight of the British and the Egyptians over constitutional safeguards, or when they were spoken to by Salāh Sālim while dancing with the Dinka or by Muhammad Sālih al-Šinqaytī during the Juba conference. This lack of a voice, or rather lack of a voice which was heard outside the South, was to change dramatically after independence.

TO BUILD A NATION

On January 1st 1956 these struggles came to an end. Sudan finally achieved its independence through a rather anticlimactic act; a vote of parliament. In theory the British and Egyptians had agreed the Sudan should decide over unity versus independence in a referendum, but in the end it was a unanimous vote in parliament which created this new state. And so it was primarily a bureaucratic act in succession of another such act, the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1953, which brought about this jumbled independence.

As a result of these various struggles, the Sudan lacked the idea of one unified independence movement. Even more importantly than that, it lacked and lacks universally recognized heroes of independence. On one side the supporters of the Umma Party and the Ansār claim up to today that Sayyid Abd-al-Raḥman al-Mahdī is the true father of independence. But many members of the Unionist parties do not only disagree, but even depict the Sayyid as a

collaborator with the British. The supporters of the Umma and the Ansār, however, believe that without their resistance Ismā'īl al-Azhari and the other members of the Aṣīqqā would have handed the Sudan to the Egyptians.

Additionally, due to the weakness of the colonial state in Sudan, the independence movement was only loosely rooted in the regions. As Bakhit argues (1974), due to *"the circumstances in which the Sudan won independence, before a fully-fledged protest movement had developed (...) 'Independence', in some form, remained a goal"* outside of the capital. The *Sudanisation* was experienced as a *Northernisation* in many areas, including the South, the East, Darfur and the Nuba Mountains. While the elites in the centre might disagree on who was at the forefront of their independence movement, in the regions independence was not experienced as such and therefore they did not become a part of the so called nationalist movement as is demonstrated by the appearance of local movements such as the General Union of the Nuba Mountains.

It is with this background in mind and the jumbled and often bureaucratic processes which led to Sudanese independence that one can understand why Sudan lacks a clear narrative of independence. The shared and collective struggle against one strong suppressor and the final victory against all odds is the base of the nationalist histories of many African states. Of course every independence struggle is multi layered and complex, also in countries with a clearer nationalist narrative such as Kenya or Ghana, but the developments in Sudan were too convoluted and contradictory to allow for a collectively acceptable national history.

It was on the basis of a narrative of independence that Nyerere could create *Ujamaa*, his project for an African socialism, Léopold Senghor his Senegalese socialism, Jomo Kenyatta *Harambee* and Nelson Mandela *Ubuntu*. The three elements together, a unified national movement, a narrative of independence and a national project, were simultaneously the result of and the basis for nation building processes attempted in other African nations. Nation building meant

to simplify and streamline complexities and the multi-layeredness of the histories of struggles into a history of independence.

Sudan in 1956 did not have a unified national movement or a narrative of independence and, at least until 1969, one can hardly find a national project and in consequence it can be observed that Sudan failed to generate the necessary cohesiveness and inclusiveness of a nation. Or to say it differently, the Sudanese elites of the independence era succeeded in part in creating a functioning state but failed to create a functioning nation.

BUREAUCRATIC INDEPENDENCE

South Sudanese independence is also the result of various struggles and processes. These struggles between the North and the South were overlapped by processes of co-operation between the two or between certain groups in each region. An attempt will be made in the following paragraphs to disentangle and reflect upon those processes.

War and separation

The story of the military struggle between North and South Sudan is relatively straightforward. After Gafar Muhammad al-Numayrī abrogated the Addis Ababa peace agreement in 1983 many Southern Sudanese army officers formed a resistance movement called the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M). Over the following 19 years the SPLA fought against three different governments in Khartoum until the Government of Sudan and the SPLA agreed on a first broad agreement on governance principles, the Machakos Protocol. Another three years later in 2005 the two parties signed the final Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).^[16]

The SPLA can even reference itself as the successor of the Anya-Nya movement, which fought the first Sudanese civil war for the South. While being debatable for academic historians, in popular history the SPLA succeeded in constructing a continuation from the Torit mutiny in 1955 all the way to South Sudanese independence in 2011. August 18th, the day of the Torit mutiny, is even celebrated as the *Day of War*

Veterans in South Sudan.^[17]

Of course there are other layers to the story of the struggle between the North and the South including Southern Sudanese in-fighting between the SPLA and the SPLA Nasir faction, the cooperation between the northern opposition and the SPLA as the National Democratic Alliance after the Asmara Declaration in 1995 and of course the unclear stance of the SPLA itself on unity versus separation. Nevertheless, the popular narrative of how the SPLA managed to achieve the concessions of the CPA has remained clear and dominant.

Cooperation and unity

The confusion with the narrative of South Sudanese independence does not arise as much from the struggle before 2005 as it does from the transitional period until 2011. During the transitional period the National Congress Party (NCP) of Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bašhīr and the SPLM suddenly shared a government and theoretically governed a country together "to make unity attractive," as the CPA put it.

When the SPLM signed the CPA the idea of unity was still alive with the movement. Their idea of unity was a unity based on the concept of the *New Sudan*, as explained by Dr. John Garang. This idea of unity is however contradictory to the idea of unity based on Sharia law as supported by the NCP. In consequence, as Douglas Johnson has argued, the idea that the two parties would work together to make unity attractive was illusory from the start.^[18] But of course, with the death of Garang in July 2005, the idea of the *New Sudan* died as well. Nevertheless, the SPLM was bound by the CPA to support unity and therefore the following years saw an awkward dance by the party officials trying to express the party's real intentions while staying in-line with the agreement.

Simultaneously, as the two parties shared the government of the Sudan, they were also supposed to come to agreements on how to conduct elections and a referendum, about borders, the three areas of dispute and post-referendum arrangements. The unwillingness of the

NCP on various issues has led multiple times to temporary coalitions between the Northern Sudanese opposition and the SPLM and in consequence it somehow seemed that the SPLM was simultaneously in government and in the opposition.

For the SPLM these were tactical decisions though and the movement was ready to abandon the northern opposition whenever they had successfully pressed their point. Under similar circumstances, the SPLM withdrew from the election in Northern Sudan and withdrew Yāsir Armān as a presidential candidate. All of this caused a certain amount of confusion over where the movement stood and where it planned to go.

Confused agendas

One of the reasons for the confusion within the SPLM, as to whether it was fighting for separation or for a unified new Sudan, arose from the confused agendas of international actors, such as the African Union, the United Nations and the United States. Additionally, the events within Sudan were suddenly seen in a different light because they were overtaken by international developments.

Three factors were especially relevant to the agendas of outside actors. Firstly, the SPLM framed its battle within the dictum of an anti-colonial struggle. The idea that they were fighting against oppression and for the self determination of their people framed them in the same context as other anti-colonial movements and therefore demanded the respect of countries who had already succeeded in this struggle. Simultaneously though, the members of the African Union had agreed not to change the colonial boundaries and the Sudanese government in Khartoum pointed out that South Sudanese independence would mean a change of colonial boundaries, a precedence for which no African state was in favour.

Secondly, the SPLM started its struggle during the regime of Gafar Muhammad al-Numayrī, continued the struggle during Sudan's third democratic period and the second government of al-Sādiq al-Mahdī

and finally after the coup d'état of Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bašhīr and Hasan Abd-Allāh al-Turābī. These regimes had very different relationships with the neighboring countries and in consequence the SPLM was able or unable to get support of weapons and bases. Thirdly, the SPLM began its struggle during the Cold War and ended it during a period where international politics were determined by an anti-terrorism agenda. In the eighties the SPLM was seen as a leftist and therefore undesirable movement in the West; after September 11th 2001 the SPLM became an anti-islamist force, not only fighting for Southern Sudanese rights, but more importantly fighting a regime which was seen as supportive of international terrorism and until 1996 hosting Usāma bin-Lādin.

These factors caused a variety of different and continuously changing positions of international organizations, neighboring countries and the various great and super powers. Vying for support and appeasing objectors, the SPLM was bound to adapt its line of argument and position; during the armed conflict and during the transitional period.

Growing internal disunity

During the transitional period after 2005 the SPLM played the benevolent older brother for the opposition in the North, then they suddenly had to deal with an opposition of their own. Besides the armed groups the SPLM suddenly had to deal with, most prominently, James Athor. The SPLM was challenged by opposition parties in the elections. The reaction was to suppress the opposition, rig the elections and limit freedom of speech in true tradition of an armed rebel group.

During the referendum the Southern opposition voices co-operated with the SPLM to ensure the desired outcome, but as the International Crisis Group has pointed out in their recent report "*as soon as the referendum results were evident, attention turned to the transitional agenda.*"^[19] So far it is unclear how strong the opposition parties and various armed movements really are, but should the SPLM decide not to co-operate with dissenting voices in the post-independence period, the South Sudanese are bound to find out.



SOUTH SUDAN, QUO VADIS?

In November 2010 the South Sudanese had to register to be allowed to participate in the referendum for independence to take place from 9th to 15th January 2011. They finally had the opportunity to determine their own future. But the whole affair was handled by the SPLM with a certain dread, as if anything could still go wrong on this last lap before reaching the finish. The message sent out was not to register in droves and make this the strongest possible message for a new nation. The message was one of care. Go out and register, but only if you live in South Sudan and only if you expect to live in the same place once the referendum happens and only if you are absolutely sure you will be able to go and vote. After so many years of war and so much death the whole event felt rather anticlimactic.

In a recent talk a high ranking member of the SPLM said that the upcoming South Sudanese independence is nothing but a bureaucratic affair, since everyone already knows that South Sudan is independent. It seems the SPLM is keen to forgo this last opportunity to use South Sudanese independence as a catalyst for nation building. It seems that after the jumbled independence of 1956 we will get the bureaucratic independence of 2011.

In 1956 the Sudan got its independence after the Egyptians had attempted for over 50 years to ensure that the Sudan would be a natural part of Egypt. The Egyptians felt that the independence of the Sudan was a separation, while the Sudanese understood it as an independence. The Egyptians had fought Sudanese independence over decades, but when it finally happened they reacted surprisingly resigned, as if their position had always been ambivalent. And they were able to accept the Sudanese right to self-determination by introducing the idea of a transitional period after which would be a referendum over separation versus unity. In 2011 the South Sudan will get its independence after the Northern Sudanese have attempted for over 50 years to ensure that the South remained a natural part of Sudan. The Northern Sudanese feel that the independence of the

South is a separation, while the Southerners understand it as an independence. The Northern Sudanese had fought South Sudanese independence over decades, but now that it is finally happening they react surprisingly resigned, as if their position has always been ambivalent. And they were able to accept the Southerners' right to self-determination by introducing the idea of a transitional period after which was a referendum over separation versus unity.

Egypt and Sudan believed that they would be able to agree on their border after independence. Up to today, the Halāib Triangle is one of the political problems between the two countries.^[20] Up to now, South and North Sudan have been unable to agree over what to do with Abyei and it seems they hope to solve this issue after South Sudanese independence. In 1955 some elements of the Egyptian regime were most likely involved in stirring instability in Sudan by supporting the Torit mutiny in the hope of preventing Sudanese independence at the last minute.^[21] Right now, certain elements of the Northern Sudanese regime are most likely supporting one or the other armed uprisings in the South in a last minute attempt to prevent South Sudanese independence. Sudanese/Egyptian relations have been notoriously bad after Sudanese independence to the disadvantage of both states. It has to be expected that this experience will be repeated between North and South Sudan.

But more worrying than all of that, it seems that due to the six years of transition the clear momentum and the clear narrative of South Sudanese independence has been lost. The SPLM is not any more accepted as the sole deliverer of good and it also seems unable to formulate a national vision which a majority is able or willing to agree on. While there is surely more of a unified national movement in 2011 than in 1956, there seems to be the same lack of narrative and the same lack of a national project and if the SPLM is not able to rectify these problems, South Sudanese independence 2011 is doomed to look much more like Sudanese independence 1956 than any South Sudanese should hope for.

As Luigi Adwok already pointed out in 1964 to his Southern "brothers and sisters; after the solution of the Southern problem, the resulting conditions will not be a holiday."^[22] The SPLM seems to stumble over the finish-line. But for now they have only succeeded in getting the easy part; they have acquired a territory. Now they must continue to work on the difficult parts; building a state and a nation. For the first of these tasks they can expect help from the international community and many neighboring countries. The second task they have to achieve on their own. And therefore one needs to be worried that South Sudan, like Sudan before it in 1956, will become a functioning state, but a failed nation.

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FASHION, FLIRTING AND FIGHTING: DANCE IN 'DINKA DISTRICTS' OF SOUTHERN SUDAN, 1929-1950

Zoe Cormack

The documentary record from the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium period in Southern Sudan contains many references, descriptions and photographs of dancing. Dance was seen by the administration as both a wondrous tribal spectacle and as a dangerous, violent outburst. Dances were repeatedly singled out as sources of insecurity in the Dinka districts of Bahr el-Ghazal Province. Attempts were made by chiefs, with the backing of District Commissioners, to stop or curtail some dances, but they were never fully successful. What was at stake in the management of dance? Why did it provoke such ambivalent reactions and why was it also so hard to stop?

There were many styles of dance in Condominium Sudan, and they produced many different reactions from the colonial authority. Despite this only a handful of books and articles deal explicitly with the subject of dance at length (Baumann 1987; Evans-Pritchard 1928; James 2000, 2007). Many scholars have pointed out that the study of dance has been marginalised in much of academia (Desmond 1997: 29). This has been attributed to a view of dance as too feminine, a simple lack of acquaintance with it (Hanna 1977: 113), or to more intellectual concerns not to write trivial or impressionistic accounts (Ranger 1975: 4). But, more recent studies are incorporating dance and it is no longer treated as merely a 'cultural extra' to the more serious study of society (James 2000: 140). Studies in the history and anthropology of dance recognize that dance is a rich area for social analysis; that there are important intersections between culture, the body and movement that can be usefully explored. As well as seeing dance as performance and art form, scholars have in particular highlighted the productions of power



and expressions of protest and complicity in dance (Reed 1998: 505). Using these insights, dances in 'Dinka districts' of Condominium Sudan need to be placed in the context of the broader historical, social and political transformations of the time.

THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO DANCE

Other studies of dance show clearly that it cannot be treated in isolation from its social context. For example, *Beni Ngoma*, a coastal Swahili integrated form of brass-band music and dance appears, superficially, to be an imitation of European styles. However, Ranger's historical study shows that this dance was not mimicry or a simple product of colonial rule, *Beni* was a mix of new and old practices which were transformed and responding to political and economic changes (Ranger 1975). Similarly, in another dance performance with steel bands like the Notting Hill Carnival in London, Abner Cohen shows that since its inception in 1965, the "*carnival [has been] continually transformed, within certain cultural and social conventions, into an expression of and instrument for the development of a new homogenous West Indian culture*" influenced and constrained and taking on new meanings according to the changing political realities of West Indians living in London (Cohen 1980: 78). In doing this, Cohen argues that the relationship between art and politics is part of broader questions of power and culture (Cohen 1980: 83). So in a sense, dance can be studied as a form of bodily movement that is layered with influences of the time, space and politics that produced it. In Sudan, Wendy James' study of the resilience of circular style of dancing, particularly in Uduk communities in the Blue Nile Sudan-Ethiopia border, again shows how dance cannot be understood outside of the wider context. She explains that the revival of the Uduk *barangu* dance in refugee camps needs to be seen as not simply a performance, but also an attempt to assert and claim space, security and articulate Uduk cultural heritage in the context of displacement and camp life (James 2000: 151; 2009: 1178).



In the context of colonialism generally it has been suggested that dance generated conflicting policies and attitudes because of the multiple associations it contained. So dance, by its physicality, could be a moral and political threat (Reed 1998: 506). Undoubtedly, dance was tinged with moral transgression for missionaries, who especially opposed it. This is shown by Wendy James in her study of Uduk dance. The Sudan Interior Mission worked in the 1940s in Chali in present day Blue Nile State. To them local dances were synonymous with paganism, sexual immorality and drunkenness. Dance was seen as a major obstacle to the mission's work: an essentially licentious practice with a contagious power to corrupt that was feared and suppressed (James 2000: 148). However, in some places, the authorities had immediate reasons to be concerned about dances, as they were also real sites of rebellion. For example, in North American slave plantations, dances often served as a pretext for previously planned revolts. This happened in South Carolina in 1730 when a planned rebellion began as slaves "*assemble[d] in the neighbourhood of the town, under the pretense of a dancing bout*" (Hazzard-Gordon 1990: 34).

Dance can be overtly political too. Scholars have shown that dance is a potent site for the creation of national and ethnic identities. Dance, in its call to the past and 'tradition', projects an image of the nation both outwards and inwards. Edward Bruner's study of Maasai dance performances in Kenya describes how these were put on for both tourists and middle class Kenyans to consume an image of the Kenyan nation (Bruner 2001). Bruner's study shows how dance performance 'works' as a symbol or emblem, because they can be interpreted by different observers, at different levels and convey multiple meanings. In Condominium Southern Sudan, dances were often used as a means to celebrate important events and visiting dignitaries. Photographs in the Sudan Archive in Durham show

performances to celebrate the visit of King George V and Queen Mary in 1911.¹

Dance is not just something you watch, it is also something you *do*. This is not just spectacle; it is also a social activity. We also need to take dance seriously as leisure, and bear in mind the motivations people have for dancing and why it is that they enjoy it. These seemingly more mundane aspects should be included in the study of dance as an important part of the lived experience of dancing. In dance, men and women's bodies are inscribed with political meanings, but these are also sites for fun, frivolity and play. The political is bound up with the ludic and vice versa. The archival records of dance in South Sudan illustrate this.

DANCES IN 'DINKA DISTRICTS', 1929-1950

The photographic and documentary record of dance across and within Dinka communities in Bahr el-Ghazal Province contains a vast array of styles and sites of dance. There are records of women's dances, generically called *dainy*² and of men only day-time mock-fighting dances (Titherington 1927: 196). Day-time dances were performed at the celebration of particular events, to commemorate a death or are linked to religious ceremonies or sacrifices (Tucker 1933). 'Dance gatherings' are particularly interesting. These were held in the evening, mainly during the rainy season and attended by young men and women, usually those from the age of 17, but generally not by the middle aged or married people (Titherington 1927: 196). These dances became an increasing source of concern to the Sudan Government and were linked to rising insecurity in some districts and this is particularly well documented in Jur River District and Gogrial. Archival sources characterize these dances and the wider issues they raised. Dance provided opportunities

¹ H C Jackson SAD 484/13/8-15

G R Storrar SAD 51/1/201-2

² Godfrey Lienhardt Diary 16th December 1947, Fan Agliu PRM 2/1

for self-expression and disciplining of the body. Dances were seen as problematic as they both shaped, and were shaped by, changing political circumstances.

Bodies in motion and on display

The body is the primary medium in dance and fashioning and displaying the body are important features of dancing. Understanding the way that dancers presented themselves is not only crucial in getting closer to their experience of dance, but it also reveals that clothing and jewelry were integral in shaping the nature of dance itself. Dances raise issues of body fashioning and of 'fashion' more narrowly.

It is possible to extract a considerable amount about the dress in the Condominium period, both from written and photographic records. The appearance of Southern Sudanese in general is much commented on by European observers. These descriptions are useful but jar with contemporary approaches to the subject. Dinka and other cattle-keeping groups were particularly singled out, almost eroticized, for their appearance. Dances, mentioned by almost every traveller, missionary, District Commissioner and anthropologist, were important in forming the outsider's image of the Dinka. In a typical, but more than usually detailed passage, Assistant District Commissioner Eyre describes men's fashion in Gogrial in 1946, noting that dances required a special attendance to fashion:

"A Dinka man's normal dress consists of a broad belt of pale blue or green beads worn round the waist and over the hips, a bead necklace, wristlets of thick brass or aluminium wire bound round the wrists and half way up the forearm, huge ivory bracelets round the upper arm, fur anklets, and nothing else. His hair is grown into a thick mat and bleached yellow with bull's urine, and is then tied with a bright blue handkerchief with a red one bound round it, and the ends sticking up like a pair of horns. Into this thick headdress is stuck an ostrich feather plume and a long


*scratching pin like a curved and flattened packing needle. He carries a spear, or a bunch of spears and a wooden club...For the dance, however, they were got up in special finery, painted with spots or stripes of yellow ochre, with a leopard skin round the shoulder the skin from the hind quarters of a gazelle or situtunga work round the hips with an absurd little black and white tail sticking out the back and white tail stockings out behind, and the chiefs in huge pyramid shaped 'bearskin' hats made of black ostrich plumes sown closely together: a truly impressive sight."*³

We know from Lienhardt's diaries that people were highly particular about the type and colour of beads they would wear. This is exemplified in the trouble Lienhardt himself experienced with bartering in beads. He had brought bright blue Czechoslovakian beads, which he had been told were popular in Dinka areas. However, he found that the Rek Dinka with whom he lived were not interested in them. They told him that the Malwal Dinka would like them; however, a Greek merchant friend, with a business in Aweil, told him there was no sale for them there either. Lienhardt also noted that ostrich beads were highly prized and people would not sell or barter them. The ivory bracelets Eyre described, worn on upper arms, called *apyot* were also highly valued: in 1948 in Gogrial town a single one of these bracelets could be bought for one cow.⁴

One of the ways that bodily ornament shaped the nature of the dance itself was through the performance and language of the dance. Lienhardt records learning that in dances in a village where he stayed during his research in Gogrial, many of the men's cries in dancing referred to the physical pain they endured in the dance. For example, they would shout *kin a rem* ('the bangles hurt') and *waat ku watt* ('beating upon beating'). There was a self-referentiality here, the pain of the dance and the cry of pain engendered by dance was part of the dance itself. The

³ Eyre SAD 693/2/1-66


⁴ Lienhardt field diary 26th April 1948, Gogrial PRM 4/4



Photograph of two men, one with some of the headscarf and bracelet described by Eyre. PRM 2005.51.269.1 Godfrey Lienhardt. Warrap, 1947-1951

scarring caused by dancing with body adornments was also part of the experience of wearing them. These scars, Lienhardt was told, were in themselves ‘*dheng*’ (handsome/ attractive).⁵ Fashions left room for interpretation and dress was not rigidly prescribed. There was room for personal innovations and self expression. Photographs of dances show men and women wearing different styles and adding new items into their outfits. The young man dancing in the centre below has integrated a boater style hat (with ostrich plume).

⁵ Lienhardt field diary 17th May 1948, Afeker. PRM 4/4



PRM 2005.51.71 Warrap. Godfrey Lienhardt, 1947-1951

Fashion was also affected by proximity to towns and markets. In Mareng, a small court centre, some distance from Aweil, Lienhardt reported a difference in dress with far fewer headcloths than in town.⁶ Living near towns gives people greater access to more types of cloth and beads, but these accessories also became associated with the cultures of town and government beyond simply practicality and access. They could be invoked in a discourse about the differences between town people, who had access to this 'modern' lifestyle and the rural, 'traditional' cattle keepers and farmers. Dance and the fashions attending it was one powerful marker of difference between town and rural areas; what looks like a practical issue of access to beads, was actually a much more important symbolic marker.

⁶ Lienhardt field diary 13th June 1948, Mareng PRM 4/4

Courtship and Romance: 'Who wants to dance with his sisters?'

Dances were social occasions, they allowed people to meet and mix. Dances and courtship were closely linked and provided a primary means of meeting partners. At a dance, couples could meet and enter into relationships that might eventually lead to marriage.⁷ As a further indication of the romantic undertones of dance, married women did not usually dance, neither did men dance with their relatives (Lienhardt 1963: 87). The interests of young people at dances could also clash with research interests! In a village in Gogrial in 1947, young men complained to Godfrey Lienhardt that the lamp he brought to their evening dances was preventing them from surreptitiously talking to girls.⁸ We might compare the observation of Evans-Pritchard, that young Nuer men in the 1930s showed great enthusiasm for mixed dances and, when there was a chance of meeting girls, would "*think nothing of walking 10 or 15 miles to attend a dance*", but who were distinctly less interested in dry season dances when cattle camps were more isolated and there was less chance of meeting unrelated girls. 'Who wants to dance with his sisters?', they would ask (Evans-Pritchard 1950: 118).

Girls would choose their dancing partners. In one popular dance in Gogrial, which Lienhardt calls the 'stamping dance', men would line up, shouting their bull names given to them at initiation (Lienhardt 1961: 17-20), and the girls would choose a man to dance with, indicating their choice by wrapping a skin around his waist. Here the importance of having the right attire becomes clear

"On a moonlight night, one can well see how the ivory arm rings, metal waist rings and the head cloth made a man stand out and attract the girls' attention. In the dark, which

⁷ Conversation with Nyangukol Manyang Madut, Lienhardt field diary 12th January 1948. Fan Agliu PRM 4/4

⁸ Lienhardt field diary, 13th December 1947. Fan Agliu PRM 2/1



is when these dances are always held, there is nothing else conspicuous about a man..."⁹

Most men would be chosen and after a small intermission go and join their partners. The dance involved couples pairing up, the men 'stamping' in front of the girls, who danced with their arms outstretched behind them.



A photograph showing a style of 'stamping dance'.
PRM 1998.346.356. Possibly taken by Godfrey Lienhardt, Warrap 1947-1950

Writing about the Ngok Dinka in the 1970s, Francis Deng highlights the importance of group coordination in dance. The power and rhythm of the dance is created by unified action: stepping, jumping or stamping at the same time. As in group singing, good dancers must harmonise their movements and not lose the step. However, there are also important solo

⁹ Lienhardt field diary, 24th February 1948. Gogrial PRM 4/4

opportunities in dance, for example at points where a man shouts his own bull name. Deng suggests that dances were, in a similar way to songs, about the individual and self-expression amidst group activity (Deng 1973: 83). Co-ordination was an important element of being a good dancer, but this did not mean uniformity and the individual dancer would have to work hard to be noticed. There clearly are here gender issues which merit further examination. Much of the pressure on display fell on men, who in many dances would hope to be picked out by women.

The politics of Dance

"Nilotic dancing", wrote A.N Tucker, a Government linguist working in the South *"echoes the two favourite occupations of these people, cattle tending and fighting"* (Tucker 1933: 22). Dance and public security frequently came up together in administrative matters in Condominium Bahr el-Ghazal. They were events that provoked a considerable amount of anxiety and discussion at the annual meetings between chiefs and District Commissioners. Large, night time gatherings of young people, many of them carrying spears, dancing and singing might have seemed intrinsically threatening to the colonial administration. It is true that fights broke out at dances, however the way that they were dealt with is revealing in itself. Although attempts were made to constrain them, night time dance gatherings were never stopped.

In Tonj, in 1944, at the annual meeting of chiefs and British Officials of Jur River District, the District Commissioner lamented that fights, which, in his words, *"started with sticks but often ended with spears"*, were a constant occurrence. As a result the prisons were swelling with 400 inmates. The chiefs present were asked to suggest ways that the situation could be alleviated. The first suggestion made was that regulations for dances should be tightened up. It was suggested that, as most quarrels started at dances, in the future permission to hold a dance must be obtained from a sub-chief. However, this

suggestion was found impractical and difficult to enforce because of the large distances between sub-chiefs, but also because the authorities were worried about losing face by introducing legislation that they could not enforce. Instead, it was reiterated that prohibitions against taking spears and clubs to dances should be more strictly enforced.¹⁰ In 1945, at the next annual chiefs' meeting in Tonj, the matter came up again, and again the need to tighten up enforcement of the ban on spears and clubs was stressed. The minutes of the 1945 meeting record that the chiefs were told they must tighten up the enforcement of the ban or find another way to prevent breaches of security associated with dances.¹¹ The Annual Chiefs' meeting in Gogrial in 1944 noted the same problems with dances. Here spears were also banned at dances. However, it was recognized that they were needed in other circumstances to offer protection against wild animals. This led to some clunky legislation, for example, spears were permitted to be carried on the way to a dance, but they had to be left some distance away from the dancing itself.¹²

Although there was difficulty in or apathy towards enforcing these rules, the ban on spears and clubs continued for some time. In the late 1940's, Godfrey Lienhardt noted in his research diaries that spears were banned at dances in Gogrial.¹³ However, contemporary photographs of dances¹⁴ seem to show people carrying spears and, on at least one occasion, Lienhardt himself gave a friend a piastre with which to rent a spear to take to a dance.¹⁵ Clubs, which were also supposed to be banned, were purportedly widely carried at dances.¹⁶ In Pacong, east of

¹⁰ Jur River District Chiefs' Annual Meeting 1944 SAD Howell 767/9/56-87

¹¹ Minutes of the Jur River District Dinka Chiefs' Meeting, Tonj 21st-26th November 1945 SAD Howell 767/9/56-87

¹² Chief's Meeting, Gogrial 15th-22nd January 1944 SAD Howell 767/9/56-87

¹³ Lienhardt field diary 4th May 1948 PRM 4/4

¹⁴ See Thesiger's photographs, taken in 1939, a close up of spears at a dance in accession number 2004.130.366331. Also see 'stamping dance' photograph above.

¹⁵ Lienhardt field diary 12th July 1950, Wan Alel PRM 3/14

¹⁶ E.g. Lienhardt field diary 12th July 1950, Wan Alel PRM 3/14

Rumbek, dances had temporarily been banned in 1950 because of fighting, but the ban only lasted a few months.¹⁷

Some of the difficulties in enforcing these rules may have been due to the ambivalence of the administration towards dance. Dances of different sorts and on different terms were facilitated and implicitly endorsed by the government. An example of this was the bull naming ceremony for a new District or Assistant District Commissioner, an occasion in which the new official was introduced to his constituents and given a Dinka name by which they would know him. V.E.F Eyre, Assistant DC of Jur River District, records that at his bull naming ceremony in Gogrial in 1946, there was "*much dancing and singing and beating of drums. We slaughtered two government bulls for the feast and the dancing went on for three days.*"¹⁸

WAYS OF THINKING ABOUT DANCE

Dances were opportunities for individual expression, group performance, meeting and mingling. They were also singled out as security concerns. Why was this and why did it prove so difficult to enforce legislation around dances? Tensions about dance gatherings must be linked to other contemporary processes. There is other evidence that, at this time, the activities of young people were being increasingly problematised and constrained. It is now recognized that colonial economics and politics radically altered the terms on which relationships between young and old could be played out, both challenging and building on existing ideas about age and power (Waller 2006: 78). For young people in Condominium Sudan, defiance of the rules was being done on different terms and had different consequences. Numerous young men voiced concerns about the changing parameters of control over courtship and marriage to Godfrey Lienhardt during his

¹⁷ Conversation with Chief Marol Riak, Lienhardt Diary Entry, 23rd September 1950. Pacong. PRM 2/8

¹⁸ Eyre SAD 693/2/1-66



fieldwork. Their comments show a perception of changing authority which had brought with it both new opportunities and new constraints. For example, in cases of *gor nya* (elopement) Lienhardt's informants in Gogrial town in 1950 felt these cases had increased because the punishment for this crime was now a prison term - which was not seen as a disincentive. This had, they suggested, reduced the number of proper marriages (*athiek*).¹⁹ At the same time, young men complained that the British government made it more difficult for them to get married because the reach of chiefly authority had been extended. Previously, some young men complained, they could have run off with a girl and, maybe after a bit of fighting, their families would have accepted it. Now, this was not the case as the government and older men would find them and bring them into line.²⁰

In the documentary record, dance and struggles over marriage and courtship are depicted in generational terms: a problem of old men not allowing the young to do as they wish, or the young being out of control. However, *analytically* treating these debates as only about generational conflict, obscures the conflicts between different kinds of authority that were equally important. It would be wrong to take these assertions literally; such comments and complaints belie real complexities. Still, such comments provide a clue that some of the terms of negotiating individual freedoms had been altered. Thinking of attempts to control dance gatherings as part and parcel of these processes of reconfiguring authority helps us to understand how they became contentious issues. The chiefs and older men had recourse to a new kind of authority, that which rested in the towns and in the hands of government officials. Young men and women did not have recourse to this - and the struggles over dance gatherings reveal as much about new forms of authority as they do of generational tensions. This new authority was not certain: there was still ambiguity, as exemplified in official

¹⁹ Lienhardt field diary 15th July 1950, Gogrial PRM 3/14

²⁰ Lienhardt Field Diary 13th July 1950, Wan Alel PRM 3/14



reticence to impose rules that everyone silently recognised would not be followed. Tensions about dances can be seen as young people attempting to remake social norms. In doing this they pushed moral and political boundaries...and the boundaries of fashion.

PRIMARY SOURCES

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Pitt Rivers Museum Manuscript Collection

Godfrey Lienhardt Papers:

Box 2, Item 1 - Fieldwork Notebook on the Dinka, 186 pp. Beginning Dec 1947

Box 2, Item 8 - Diary for 1950 containing fieldwork notes on the Dinka

Box 3, Item 14 – Fieldwork notes on the Dinka

Box 4, Item 4 - A fieldwork notebook on the Dinka

Pitt Rivers Museum Photographic Collection

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<http://southernsudan.prm.ox.ac.uk/search/photographer/lienhardt>

Photographs of Wilfred Thesiger. Available online (accessed on 17.05.2011):

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THE ROLE OF REMITTANCES IN FARMING : THE GEDAREF AREA OF EASTERN SUDAN

Khalid M. Mustafa Aburaïda

This study is based on a field survey carried out in the Gedaref area in 2006 with the aim of collecting data to determine the performance of the agricultural credit system in the rainfed traditional and mechanized sectors, and to assess its impact on the agricultural production in rural areas where the financial problem strongly exists. The results indicated the importance of subsidies as one of the main constituents of self-finance among the small-scale producers to whom formal finance is nearly absent due to the difficulty of providing the guarantees or collaterals needed by the banks or any of the other financial institutions.

Credit availability is considered as the main limiting factor in the rural rainfed sub-sectors in Sudan both mechanized and traditional. Only a small proportion of limited credit has trickled down to small farmers in these rainfed sub-sectors.

On average 36% of the credit disbursed by the Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS) over the three years 2000-2002, to the mechanized rainfed sub-sector, went mainly to large scale farmers with farm sizes greater than 500 feddans. Small farmers, with holdings less than 500 feddans and who cultivated about 50% of the acreage in the mechanized rainfed sub-sector received only a limited amount of credit directly from the Agricultural Bank of Sudan because they were short of guarantees acceptable to the Bank.

Small farmers depend mainly on self-finance sources (domestic savings and remittances) for their finance, but in recent years small farmers have suffered from many problems besides low



productivity, namely, high production costs, low selling prices for their produce etc.

These and other reasons collectively were behind the insufficiency of their incomes and made them unable to meet their needs. Subsequently, farmers were forced to borrow from external sources whether formal or informal to bridge this gap.

REMITTANCES:

Remittances can be defined as:

"The money and goods transmitted to households back home, by people working away from their origin communities".

"Remittance is the transfer of money by a foreign worker to his or her home country. Many low-income people, especially those from poor rural areas, seek to improve their lives by migrating in search of work and extra income, and are increasingly moving across national borders and farther afield".

Remittances contribute to economic growth and to the livelihoods of oppressed people worldwide. As a result, money sent home by migrants constitutes the second largest financial in-flow for many developing countries and exceeding international aid. During disasters or emergencies, remittances can be a vital source of income for people whose other forms of livelihood may have been destroyed by conflict, natural disaster (floods, earth-quakes, drought, storms,...etc) or even by crop failures.

Remittances in Sudan

Khartoum State is thought by many people in the country to be rich in resources, and as such has attracted large segments of the country's population.

Generally the main reason for internal and external migration in Sudan is a search for better livelihood conditions. Internal migration is sometimes seasonal for wage earning in the large scale irrigated farming projects where seasonal work

opportunities are found, as for example, in the major agricultural schemes of Gezira, Rahad and New Halfa. Seasonal work is also found in the agro-industrial projects, particularly in the sugar production factories.

According to the National Population Council Workforce Survey, 1996 most of the internal migration in the country was of the urban to urban type, followed in size by rural to urban migration. The figures suggest that urban centres constitute a strong pull in internal migration. Seemingly, rural to urban migrations generally involve migration to urban market towns of the rural areas, and from there to major urban centres either in the same State or to another with more livelihood opportunities. According to the 1996 Workforce Survey there were 3,333,000 internal migrants, of which urban to urban accounted for 1,232,000. By far the most important movement in this group was to Khartoum State with 700,000. Rural to urban migration accounted for 1,039,000. A further 615,000 are recorded as rural to rural migrants and included seasonal movements referred to above.

Normally, younger and more educated males tend to migrate to urban centres, while the illiterate and less educated members of the population tend to remain in their areas of origin, as crop cultivators (farmers) and livestock raisers (pastoralists). Internal migration in Sudan became important in the 1970's but intensified in the following three decades.

External migration is mostly motivated by a desire for economic gain, given the limited absorptive capacity of the available internal employment opportunities, especially as applies to the conditions that have prevailed in the country in recent decades. The yearly breakdown of that number by years and the receiving countries is displayed in table 1. It is clear that the most favoured countries are Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. In recent years, the remittances earned by migrants to those States have come to have an important effect on the Sudanese



Table 1

Sudanese working abroad with legal contracts classified by Receiving Countries (1998-2007)

Years Receiving countries	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total
Saudi Arabia	15680	39170	33361	28802	28834	17392	14904	9885	6825	11641	206494
United Arab Emirates	86	1143	1386	1358	994	1001	1010	792	813	1015	9598
Qatar	254	485	742	530	494	312	272	252	478	655	4474
Kuwait	13	17	11	20	38	147	227	120	146	170	879
Sultanate of Oman			19	42	235	42	85	121	56	119	749
Bahrain			26		20	8	7	2	1	5	69
Yemen	3	4			25	9	4	1	3	7	56
Jordan	14	21	3		1	1	4	1	1	1	47
Libya		6	3		5	3			4	4	25
Lebanon							1		2	1	4
Great Britain					2					1	3
Other countries	1	1		9	2	6					39
Total	16051	40847	35551	30761	30650	18921	16514	11184	8339	13619	222437

Source : Bureau for Organizing the Affairs of Sudanese Working abroad, Ministry of labour, Public Services & Human Resources Development, Sudan.

economy, profoundly affecting poverty income distribution, and rural economic development in the communities from which they migrated, putting into consideration that migrants have a higher marginal propensity than non-migrants to allocate expenditure to investments such as land, agricultural equipments, vehicles and small enterprises. However, it is noticeable that the peak year was 1999 since when there has been a substantial decline and by 2007 the figures had fallen by two-thirds.

GEDAREF AREA

Gedaref is a trade centre for grains, especially sorghum, and is the well-known agricultural area where mechanized farming has been introduced since 1945. To-day, 70% of the total mechanized farming area in Sudan is carried out in the Gedaref region. Many of the individual farms grew suddenly and scattered over the whole area surrounding the city of which the best known are Um-Seinat, Ghadambliya, Simsim and Doka.

Gedaref city is linked with Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, through a net of roads (about 410 km). It is also linked to Port Sudan with roads through Kassala at a distance of about 200km. There are also roads to Galabat at the edge of the boundaries with connections to the Ethiopian city of Gondar, and from there to Addis Ababa.

The population of Gedaref has rapidly increased to about 1,148,262 persons in 2009. In 1994 it became the capital of Al-Gedaref State. The mosaic of the city's population includes many Sudanese tribes from different regions which are well integrated in Gedaref society and also includes many foreigners. The main reason for the gathering of foreign and local groups of people in Gedaref can be attributed to the agricultural boom that swept the city and turned it into a major centre of



trade in the east. It has now become the granary of the Sudan with the cultivation of not only sorghum but also sesame, sunflower, peanuts and cotton.

The climate is hot, and rainy in summer. The rainy season extends to four months with an average of annual rainfall of 700 to 900 mm.

Remittances in the Gedaref Area:

This part of the paper aims to provide an idea of the importance of remittances in the Gedaref area, and examines their effect on rural farming whether directly (agricultural activities) or indirectly (living and investment activities).

It is based on a household survey conducted in the year 2006, in five localities in the Gedaref area. The sample size is 193 farmers distributed over all these five localities. The study examines the economic and social determinants of the remittances within the context of migration and human capital models of sustainable development. These models suggest that younger and better educated people choose to migrate because of better earning possibilities in a labour market.

Although international remittances have a positive effect on poverty alleviation and sustainable development all over the Sudan, in Gedaref area internal and external migration seem to be particularly considerable and widely accepted. The survey results show that almost one third of the interviewed farmers (32%) had one or more of their relations migrated outside the area either abroad or inside the country. At the same time, their contribution to farming needs (57%) like buying seeds, hiring labour and machinery is very important. This is followed by social or general livelihood expenditure, namely housing and living (39%), and the rest (4%) is for the non-farm investment, as shown in table 2.



Table 2: Distribution of Remittance Subsidies in Gedaref Area, 2005

Particulars	Number of farmers	Percent (%)
(1) Sending	61	32
Buy seeds	11	07
Buy farm machineries	11	-
Pay for hired labor	24	12
Non –farm investment	02	01
Pay for loans	-	-
Living expenses	24	12
(2) Not sending	132	68
Total	193	100.0

Source: the author's field survey -2006

It is possible that such remittances had augmented funds for farming expenses more widely than the above data items, including the activities leading to extra income and hence to assist more and more in the poverty alleviation process and the final outcome will definitely be a more equal and balanced sustainable development.

CONCLUSION:

Although micro-finance is generally agreed upon as the master key for poverty alleviation and sustainable development among the small farmers in rural areas, this conception unfortunately failed to be a reality in Sudan. Reasons behind this failure are multiple, but the most important ones are:

- Weak financial capabilities of the Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS), as the authorized capital is not enough and widely failed to meet the needs of small farmers.
- Guarantees and the conditions required by the official financial institutions have forced small farmers to have to borrow from the informal sources at a much higher cost of financing than that charged by the formal institutions.
- Specialized institutions have appeared recently as the magic solution for promoting formal finance to small farmers in Sudan, yet this solution is regarded as a copy of the already existing commercial institutions, which have concentrated in urban areas with highly expensive requirements.



- The worst of all problems is that of fluctuating, and often, low yields and inadequate structures and support services leading to delays in loan repayments.

From the material presented in this paper it is evidently clear that there is a substantial influence of remittances as a sort of self-finance beside home savings, on the performance of the agricultural credit in the rainfed sub-sector, with respect to both area cultivated and the quantity produced .

Finally, it is very important for the Sudanese decision makers in the agricultural sector to diagnose seriously the persisting defect in the field of micro-finance giving it the top priority. Therefore, a number of recommendations are suggested:

First: Support is required from the government towards the small producers to improve their situation with respect to credit delivery and secure access to credit.

Second: Minimize the production cost as far as possible by reducing the different governmental taxes.

Third: The government should take more steps to encourage remittances as a good source of self-finance like lowering the taxes for migrant workers who send money back to their families.

Fourth: Develop good rural infrastructures and improve access to suitable technologies.

Fifth: More efforts should be exerted to solve the problem from its grass-root level, for example, strengthening the real and domestic sources of finance as remittances subsidies, saving opportunities and capabilities. Hence, a lot of work and effort should not only be directed towards the formal finance and banking system, but also towards self-finance in general.

(For location see Figures 1A & 1B in the other Butana paper)



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FARMING, HERDING, WATER AND RANGELAND IN THE BUTANA

Sameer Alredaisy, Abdel Aziem Tinier and Jack Davies

Conflict between crop growers and herders is not a new problem. The nomad has always looked down upon the farmer because farmers are seen as people tied down to a particular place whereas the nomad has the freedom to move around as part of the search for pasture and water for the animals. This ability to move from place to place is important in semi-arid lands like the western part of the Butana plain (Figures 1A & 1B) as rainfall fluctuations bringing drought give the mobility of nomadism a distinct advantage over sedentary cultivation. However, since the 1990s conflict between the two groups has become much more serious. Pressure on water and grazing was noted as long ago as the 1950s. One of the authors remembers in 1957 a *hakra* (tribal gathering) arranged by the Singa District Commissioner, Alim Ramadan, to discuss the problem with the chiefs of the Kenana and Rufa's El Hoi tribes, the outcome of which was to allow some *fereigs* (family groups) who traditionally did not cross into the lands between the White and Blue Niles to do so in the dry season because of a shortage of water and accessible pasture caused by increasing population and an increase in the areas under mechanized agriculture.

This situation has been characterized by animal trespass onto farmer's fields by desperate nomads, destruction of *hafirs* (hollows excavated usually to-day by machinery and placed so as to collect rain run off) intended for livestock to deter herders bringing their animals, the burning of crop remains on the fields to deprive herders of their traditional access to such remains, illegal closure of agreed animal routes and such like. This paper is a brief review of some of these problems in Rufa'a Rural Council and East Butana Rural Council areas. Fieldwork was carried out through






Figure 1a: The Butana

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


Figure 1b: The Butana

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


Figure 2: Study area

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general discussions and by questionnaire survey in 6 representative villages. In Rural Rufa'a Council area these villages were Uraibat, Abu Galfa and Um Shanig Sa'ad and in Rural East Butana Council area Tundub Abu Kilaiwa, Zarga Ahmed Sa'eed and Id El Khidr (Fig 2).

TRADITIONAL RAINFED AGRICULTURE

This is the major economic activity among those in the survey. 74% owned farms with an average size of 12 feddans and depend on rainfall. They operate the *teras* system which uses bunds across the slope of farm land to hold back the flow of any rainwater with the object of encouraging it to sink into the soil. 62.5% use tractors to plough their lands in order to reduce the need for family farm labour. Older people interviewed indicated that in the past they used to restrict cultivation to a portion of their holding and employed a fallow period for the rest regardless of the reliability or otherwise of the rainfall. 78.5% said that they now cultivate all of their lands having abandoned the fallow system entirely. This figure rises to 99.7% in years of good rainfall. This change has a clear impact upon the amount of land on or near farms for grazing. 48.7% of interviewees gave the narrowing of the grazing area as an underlyingly cause of conflict.

NOMADISM

There are 5 different types of nomadism in the Butana of which the first three could be described as 'traditional' (Fig 1B). First, pure nomadism which implies widespread wandering according to the seasons; second, semi-nomadism as practiced by the Shukriya with permanently designated routes and grazing areas; and thirdly, semi-sedentary including transhumant tenancies whereby the participants have a permanent base with a defined agricultural area with limited amount of animal movement. There are however two more recent forms: *Al Nagla*, a new system where nomads are

associated with an irrigation scheme but still maintain their herds. A good example is that of nomads holding tenancies in the Khashm El Girba (New Halfa) irrigation Scheme. The other recent feature is a grazing farm. This is the An'am el Butana scheme, north-west of Tamboul town. It is a mobile grazing farm for sheep rearing. Water is transported by tankers to areas of sheep gathering in natural grazing areas, so as to prevent excessive animal concentration around water points to enable these natural pastures to be used for a longer period.

WATER SUPPLIES

The main surface waters of the study area besides rain are the Blue Nile and the River Rahad. The geology of the Butana means that many areas, especially towards the east, are underlain by impervious Basement Complex rocks which hold very little water, although some small pockets of underground water are available from shallow wells in the detritus washed down from a few of the hills. 19 ephemeral streams were located in the study area, of which the largest, Khor Wad El A'araki, has a measuring station. Its flow is highly variable like the rainfall. In 1992 it recorded 11.9 million m³, but less than 320,000m³ in 1993. In 1992 it recorded 7 flood events, but only 2 in 1993 (Wad el A'araki Station file, 1996).

In suitable places near the Blue Nile and Rahad rivers artesian wells can be successfully drilled into the Nubian Sandstone to reach water with increasing depth with distance away from the two rivers from less than 10 to more than 60 metres (Gar El Nabi, 1993). There were 122 water yards supplied by artesian water of which 63 were in Rufa'a district and 59 in eastern Butana (Department of Water Supply, Rufa'a, 1996). The second source of water is the *hafir*. Government ones are confined to Eastern Butana but there are 7 locally dug ones in the study area. Of the 5 government operated *hafirs* in Eastern Butana one was intended



for human use and the others for animals (General File of Hafirs, Rufa'a Province, 1958 to 1996). According to government files there should be more than enough water from these sources for everyone in the study area. Rural Rufa'a is said to have a yield of 5.2 million m³ from artesian wells against an estimated consumption of 3.1 million m³ giving it a comfortable surplus. Rural East Butana was said to have a yield of 5.3 million m³ from artesian sources and a further 0.16 million from *hafirs*, giving a total of 5.46 million m³ against an estimated demand of 1.8 million m³, giving a very comfortable surplus (Department of Water Supply, Rufa'a, 1996). However, fieldwork suggests that government figures are simply not met in practice because they are based upon theoretical possible yields without reference to situations on the ground. The true amount available is perhaps not more than 40% of official figures, which implies a substantial deficit.

SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF CONFLICT

In 1995-96 there were 26 cases of clashes between nomads and settled farmers (Gezira State Police files, 1996) in the study area. However, it is certain that the true number of incidents is very much higher. More than half of those interviewed during fieldwork could be described as in some way being associated with or had direct knowledge of some of these activities. These included destruction of *hafirs*. The reasons for this in the Butana include *Hafir* Wad Bagal, constructed to provide water for livestock but destroyed by farmers to discourage grazers and diverting the stored water for cultivation. Another *hafir* constructed for human consumption was also destroyed because nomads were attracted to it and were proving a nuisance to local farmers.

Fire was also a source of conflict. Although farmers use fire to clean their farms of the remains left over from the previous season to improve fertility, they are now using it to drive away grazers

from their farms. Cases were also recorded of some grazers setting fire to crop remains in order to deprive other groups of grazers from their use and thereby keeping them away from that area. There were also cases of farmers deliberately tractor ploughing their lands so as to destroy plant remains, including the first shoots of the new season, to deter the grazers.

Animal intrusion is common. There are defined routes for nomadic movements and there are some pasture reserved areas, but these are often ignored by farmers who cut off routes and trespass onto reserved areas in order to deter nomads and to use the reserved areas for agriculture. They also interfere with water supplies created to assist conflict-free passage of nomads along designated routes. Inevitably, there will be a re-action from nomadic groups with field invasions, undeterred by threats of fine or loss of animals.

The Causes of Conflict

Population increase

The population of Al Butana Mohafaza in 1993 was about 500,000 (1993 census). This is a 5-fold increase since that of 1955 and the population is still mainly rural with some 80% recorded in 1993 as engaged in rural occupations compared with 90% in 1955. Figures for nomadism are not very useful as the tiny number (c7,000 in the 1993 census) is very misleading. Basically you were recorded as 'nomadic' only when the enumerator could not put you in another category! Many others with many livestock were thus excluded. These figures alone suggest that there is an enormous increase in pressure over land use and presage likely conflict. The survey identified an overall average family size of 6.5, with 11% of families exceeding 10 persons. 68.4% of the population was aged 15 to 59 and 27.2% under 15. The average annual rate of population increase is 5.7%. In the survey over 20% gave population increase as an important cause of conflict, especially as

this increase in numbers has led to settlement expansion and pressure on rangeland.

Development Programmes

In the past, in spite of various degrees of antagonism farmers and herders got on reasonably well. The herders got the crop remains and access to fallow land and in return the farmers had their fields fertilized. Since the Second World this state of balance has been upset by various agricultural development programmes. Large areas have been taken over by development projects. First was the development of mechanized agriculture which began in 1946 around Gedaref and spread rapidly to other parts of the Butana (Davies, 1964). Mechanised agriculture was developed in order to expand dura and sesame production because during the Second World War traditional farming systems had proved incapable of supplying the country's needs. Mechanization was believed to be the solution. Much of the Butana grasslands at this time were largely unused due to lack of water. Mechanised crop production together with a *hafir* digging programme were believed to be the solution as less labour would be required, especially in the harvest period when water shortage was most severe. The *hafirs* would allow use of formerly waterless areas.

The second important development programme was the expansion of irrigation in the Butana by utilizing the waters of the Atbara through the Khashm el Girba (New Halfa) Scheme which was designed for the resettlement of Nubians displaced by the flooding of their lands by the water stored behind the Egyptian High Dam. It was also intended to encourage nomadic settlement, but in this it was largely unsuccessful. In fact, it disrupted activities downstream of the dam by depriving farmers there of the silt which was now deposited in the reservoir behind the dam. The second major irrigation development was the Rahad Scheme using Rahad River and Blue Nile waters. Thirdly, a short distance north of Rufa'a, the Guneid sugar scheme was developed using Blue



Nile waters. In each of these cases the presence of nomadic owned and other domestic livestock was considered to be incompatible with the scheme's aims. Clearly, all three schemes involved a considerable reduction in grazing lands and, at least to begin with, did not provide water for livestock.

Each of these major developments has had at least an indirect effect on the study area by reducing access to rangeland and some traditional water supplies in other parts of the Butana, and by restricting the areas available for more traditional rainland farming in the face of an increase in the size of the population. However, the Rahad Scheme has had a more direct effect on the study area as 80,000 of its 300,000 feddans lie within it. Further, the Rahad Scheme absorbed some highly esteemed dry season grazing along the River Rahad.

The development of some 200 small pump schemes along the Blue Nile has also had a significant direct impact upon the study area. Many of these were originally *sagia* (animal operated water wheels) schemes and the introduction of pumps has allowed a significant increase in the area they can irrigate. There are also another nearly 300 small irrigation developments in the study area using water from artesian bores and shallow wells for irrigation. All these factors prohibit or restrict severely river access for livestock with the inevitable conflicts over land and water use.

Climatic change

Perhaps surprisingly, only 5% in the survey thought climatic change was significant as the interviewees pointed out that variation in rainfall is simply a fact of daily life. However, it does have an impact on rangeland in particular. At Wad Medani the annual average rainfall for 1951 to 1980 was 343mm. For 1981 to 1990 it was 280mm, a reduction of 19%. In 1990 the fall was 115mm, or 22% below the average and was below the previous low record of 147mm in 1984 (Meteorological Station, Wad

Medani). These figures will inevitably draw herders further south and lead to congestion and serious overgrazing around the most significant watering places leading to much conflict and an eating out of the more palatable grazing species (Zubeir, 1996). Some nomadic reaction to a drought situation is on the face of it logical but could be disastrous. One of the authors recalls a conversation with a group of nomads round a waterhole in the Butana in 1986. He asked how the drought of 1984 had affected them. They said that they had lost a half of their herds. When asked what they would do about it, one said that before the drought he had 100 camels, but the drought reduced his herd to 50, so he would increase his herd to 200 so that after the next drought he would still have 100 left!

Government

Government policy has been a top-down one regarding development. Extending rainland crop production through mechanization was not only intended to increase crop production and improve rural income, but it also had a social element through its 'participating cultivator' scheme (Davies, 1964). The idea was to enable peasant farmers without resources to become involved and held out the prospect of rising up to become scheme owners. As with so many government policies it was not successful because the planners had failed to relate to the culture and aspirations of the people involved. Many of the problems of the New Halfa and Rahad Schemes relate to similar failures.

In a similar way there has been no coherent policy from above to see how all the various developments fit together. In essence, there has not been any proper attempt to involve the people, who are to be most affected, in the early planning stages. Each of the tribes of the Butana has its own traditions based upon a long experience of what works successfully and what does not. These solutions are not static but are constantly evolving. At its worst top-down



development runs the possibility of central planners telling people what is good for them!

All these situations are easily turned into sources of conflict, but are also made worse by other local failures. Thus, the demarcation of livestock routes and regulations about their use, the creation of reserved pasture areas and posited amounts of water available need to be properly enforced and checked. Breakdowns in equipment and failure to supply spare parts quickly will soon make figures for water availability over optimistic. The situation with *hafirs* is a case in point. Unless the guards are given support and inspections are regularly carried out then *hafirs* become increasingly inefficient as sources of water and causes of conflict. *Hafirs* silt up and unless cleaned out regularly hold back less and less water. Unless the banks are maintained properly and the channels that carry run off to them are kept clear, water will not be collected satisfactorily. Unless there is proper maintenance of the fences then water is soon polluted by animals and their faeces making the water unfit for both human and animal consumption.

CONCLUSION

The causes of conflict arrived at through interviews in the six randomly chosen villages resulted in 77.2% declaring that the major source of conflict between sedentary farmers and herders was the narrowing down of grazing areas. 48.7% put this down to the expansion of agricultural land. 20.1% gave settlement expansion due to population increase as a cause, but only 5% thought that drought and a changing climate were important.

Much of the failure here is related to a piecemeal programme of agricultural development, a failure to discuss new developments properly with those likely to be affected by the changes. People need to identify with the proposed programme of development otherwise it is much less likely to succeed. Further, good intentions

and suitable solutions cannot be effective unless proper oversight is maintained to see that rules are enforced. Some consideration of these points might help to reduce the prevalence of conflict between farmers and herders in the Butana.

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BOOK REVIEW

Mary L Keenan, **That Hard Hot Land**, Mary Keenan, Parbold, 2011, 416pp. ISBN 978-0-9564910-0-8

[Available direct from the author at 26 Broadmead, Parbold, Lancs., WN8 7PB, UK, for £50 plus £5 for postage in UK]

This is a real labour of love on the part of Mary Keenan in which she has shown a remarkable degree of tenacity in chasing up sources of information. This book is about a British plant collecting expedition to the Sudan in 1933-34 led by Cecil Graham Traquair Morison from Christ Church, Oxford, supported by Dunstan Skilbeck also on the staff of Oxford University who later became Principal of Wye College, and by James Edgar Dandy, her mother's maternal cousin, who later became Head Keeper in the Botany Department at the British Museum. Further details about this expedition are to be found in *Sudan Studies* 35 (July 2007). Suffice it to say that Mary managed to obtain access to Dandy's diary, his voluminous field notes and the more than 350 photographs he took during the expedition. All these items are transcribed in full detail and the book contains nearly all of Dandy's photographs. She also tracked down and transcribed Dunstan Skilbeck's diary of the trip. It would appear that Morison did not do much as far as fieldwork was concerned, leaving the other two to the main task. He excused himself from one part of the expedition and went home early!

Dandy's diary is very factual about what had been done, whereas Skilbeck's is much more concerned with what he observed and is an excellent source for views on problems of life for both British officials and Sudanese at that time and the title of the book is a direct quotation from his diary. He was impressed by the quality and good work they were doing in general but some officials he saw as patronising, pompous and full of their own importance. On one occasion he was taken to task about such criticisms by a well-

travelled Romanian, Princess Hunyardi, that he met who told him, *'You English always send out the best of your country to places like this [meaning especially south Sudan] – everyone else the worst – or only the mediocre'*.

Collecting field data began after they got off the train at El Obeid and they proceeded west to El Fasher finding the road across the sandy *qoz* country very trying and Skilbeck found Christmas night at Wad Banda *'very cold'*. Then on to Jebel Marra which they enjoyed enormously and which Skilbeck describes as *'interesting and fine savage country in wild mountains'*. They found the summit of Jebel Marra very cold with ground frost but it did not deter Skilbeck from bathing in one of the crater lakes. He tells us that the *farash* at the Kebkabia Rest House had four medals and had served with Gordon and Hicks Pasha but then deserted to the Mahdi.

Skilbeck mused over education in the Sudan and asks what it is intended to achieve. He writes in his diary, *'Education, but how and what for. Gordon College is obviously wrong. Problem of the impossibility of fitting in a young Sudanese who had become cultured in Egypt and later in England. There is no place for him in his own country.technical education must proceed everything first'*. He also muses on the creation of a Sudanese state and notes that in Jebel Marra there is *'no loyalty to the Emirate and Sudan means nothing'*.

They returned to El Fasher before setting off for the Nuba Mountains to complete their work in central Sudan. They took the steamer from Tonga to Juba to continue work now into the more forested areas of Sudan, travelling westwards to Yei and including a visit to Aba in the Belgian Congo to talk with like minded folk. They travelled further west collecting samples as far as Source Yubo where they met French officials. Next, to Wau where Dandy was compelled to leave a very sick Skilbeck in care of the doctor.

Eventually they met up again in Khartoum prior to their return home via Egypt.

Both Dandy and Skilbeck were impressed by how hard a life it was for British officials 'out in the bush' and were impressed with the work that they did. They also had praise for the work done by village dispensaries, Syrian doctors and medical services in general. In view of his own experience Skilbeck was particularly grateful. They were also impressed by the facilities Greek traders had brought to remote areas and for the friendliness and hospitality received from Sudanese and everyone else.

This book is an impressive piece of work. Besides the diaries and fieldnotes of the two main actors, Mary Keenan adds an impressive potted biography of each of the myriad number of people they met on their travels and reproduces nearly all of Dandy's photographs. She has done her ancestor proud.

Jack Davies



BOOK REVIEW

Derek A Welsby, **Sudan's First Railway – The Gordon Relief Expedition and the Dongola Campaign**, Sudan Archaeological Research Society, Publication no 19, 2011
A4 page size, 149 pages, many illustrations, including maps.
ISBN 978 1 901169 1 89.

This book is a fascinating combination of a history of “Sudan’s First Railway” and description of an extensive archaeological survey along the route of the railway, which has taken place since 2008.

In 1860 the Egyptian Viceroy Said Pasha originally proposed a railway to link Egypt and the Sudan. However, it was not until the later time of Ismail Pasha that, on 15th February 1875, the first rails were laid at Wadi Halfa. The line was to run southwards, very roughly parallel with the Nile, and rails would eventually be extended to Kerma, some 200 miles to the south – but not until 1897. Shahin Pasha was the Egyptian Government’s consulting engineer, and John Fowler was the British engineer. The gauge of rails chosen, 3 feet 6 inches, which differed from the use in Egypt of the British “standard gauge” of 4 feet 8½ inches, was recommended by Fowler “*who entertained the hope that it [the Wadi Halfa railway] might one day be linked to the South African railway system, with its identical [3 feet 6 inches] gauge*”. An interesting aside is that when the planners of the Uganda Railway in British East Africa pondered the gauge question in the early 1890s, they favoured metre gauge over the South African 3 feet 6 inches due to the ready availability of metre gauge locomotives and rolling stock from India, where metre gauge was widely used.¹

Progress southwards from Wadi Halfa was slow. By 1877 the rails had only reached Sarras (33½ miles) and the line was not functioning well. In 1877 control of the line was handed over to the Governor General of the Sudan, but Gordon was not keen on

the project. A government Commission, reporting in June 1883, regretted “*that a large sum has already been expended in the hopeless task of developing this route*”. However, as the Gordon Relief Expedition was being planned, Wolseley (in April 1884) brought the existence of the Wadi Halfa line to notice, and construction was restarted by the Royal Engineers. Akasha (87¼miles) was reached in 1885. But then the line began to be attacked by the Mahdi’s troops, who shouted “*Railway finish. Telegraph finish. You finish.*” A military stalemate then applied until the start of the Dongola Campaign in 1896, during which year the railway was ‘reconstituted’ and the railhead advanced to Kosha (108 miles from Wadi Halfa). The line finally reached its eventual terminus, Kerma (201 miles) on 4th May 1897. The decision to build the main railway route southwards from Wadi Halfa towards Khartoum by cutting across the desert, together with the end of hostilities, left the Wadi Halfa to Kerma line isolated and underused. It was officially closed at the end of December 1904.

Seeing that the railway was abandoned so long ago, it is amazing that the archaeological team discovered so many artefacts which are linked to the railway and the associated military activities. After 16 pages outlining the railway’s history, its rolling stock, and its part in the Dongola Campaign, come first some 60 pages discussing in general terms what has survived from railway days – from the railway track itself to remains of stations and military camps. Then come nearly 70 pages covering the artefacts found in detail, together with an extensive collection of illustrations of artefacts. Google Earth surveys were used to back up the archaeology on the ground.

Two minor comments: Firstly, Richard Hill’s 1945 paper “*The Sudan Railway, 1875: an introduction*” is noted in the text, but fails to make the bibliography. (Perhaps Hill’s notes on this railway in his classic “*Sudan Transport*” could also have been mentioned.) Secondly, plate 12 in the book shows “*Kitchener’s Coach*”, now preserved at Chatham Dockyard, and reputed to



have been used whilst Kitchener was in the Sudan. However, the coach last ran on a standard (4 feet 8½ inches) gauge line in this country. Was it therefore re-gauged from 3 feet 6 inches gauge, as would have been needed in the Sudan?

This is a fascinating and well researched book, and can be recommended to Sudan railway historians and those interested in the archaeology of railway and military activity in the Sudan covering the late nineteenth century.

¹ Gunston, Henry. (2004) 'The planning and construction of the Uganda Railway', *Transactions of the Newcomen Society*, vol. 74, no. 1, pp. 54/5

Henry Gunston

BOOK REVIEW

Guma Kunda Komey: Land, Governance, Conflict and the Nuba of Sudan. James Currey, Eastern Africa Series. Woodbridge & Rochester, NY: Boydell & Brewer Ltd., 2010.

In the first place, this book can claim to be the most comprehensive modern account available of the region we know as the Nuba Hills, or Mountains, its patchwork of peoples speaking many dozens of different languages, their history and the sources of their common marginalization within the Sudanese state. At a theoretical level Guma Kunda Komey, Assistant Professor of Geography in the University of Juba, rejects cultural or linguistic diversity, religion, or 'ethnicity' as primary factors in regional history. Instead, he focuses on land questions, specifically the competing claims to land and its multiple uses by individuals and groups, as the main factor shaping relations between the settled Nuba peoples themselves, between these and the nomadic, Arabic-speaking pastoralists who move through the low plains between the hills, and between all these local communities and the State. And finally, this book works in a broad sense as a political manifesto. It aims to speak for the Nuba people as a whole in their current predicament, as they see their former brothers in the general liberation struggle of the SPLM/A finally opt for secession of the South – leaving the Nuba bracketed with an unforgiving North.

Looking at these three themes in reverse order. In Part III of the book, Komey gives a detailed account of the various peace efforts that eventually led to negotiations from 1994 under the auspices of the neighbouring governments involved in IGAD, culminating in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005. At many points in this process, the case was made that any peace settlement should take account of the fact that the



SPLM/A's aim was to achieve political and social reform across the whole country. For this reason, it found effective support as it took the war across the old borders of the 'south' into some 'northern' provinces. The case was made repeatedly for acknowledging the claims of what became known as the 'Three Areas', north of the 1956 provincial boundaries – that is, Abyei, the Nuba Hills of southern Kordofan, and the southernmost parts of the Blue Nile Province. The voice of various Nuba-based organizations and spokesmen was heard loud and clear throughout the negotiations, and in the end some special provisions were made for these areas. As of the time of writing (early June, 2011) the outcome of postponed and contested elections in South Kordofan has not yet allowed any time or political space for the promised 'popular consultations' there before the South's independence on 9th July (Blue Nile has made more progress on this front). But events on the ground in Abyei have overtaken any realistic hopes that the Nuba people will be treated fairly under the provisions of the CPA. The referendum provided for the people of Abyei has not happened; and regardless even of the decision over its boundaries by the International Tribunal at The Hague in 2009, it was overrun by SAF forces in May 2011, and the vast majority of its people fled. The Nuba people stand on a shaky precipice indeed, along with those of the Blue Nile, and Komey's account of how this situation has come about is surely testimony to the brutal character of Sudanese *real-politik* at the highest levels of the state's current regime, and its methods of engagement with perceived opponents.

At the more local level, however, of the Arab nomad communities and hill-based villages of the Nuba 'on the ground', Komey demonstrates in several chapters of this book that inter-community interactions have often had a positive character. Prosperous villages have often hosted others at times of difficulty, and there have been many opportunities for trade, cultural exchange, and intermarriage. The 'social worlds' thus created, and often in flux, were based on links which to-day

defy reduction to fixed ethnic lines of separation or the exclusive definition of territories. In Part II, Komey shows that even during the height of the recent civil war, despite the forced displacement and other deprivations imposed on many Nuba, partly through the infamous Baqqara militias, an older pattern of collaboration and trading did re-emerge in some places. Unofficial, and sometimes clandestine, markets operated across the government/SPLA lines. In these chapters, as well as in the final ones, Komey uses case-studies based on his own recent fieldwork in specific village localities of the Nuba region. He illustrates again and again that conflicts, whether local or at the instigation of state authorities, have always arisen from the issue of competing claims to the use of land. Disappointment with the policies of the central government over land, and their use of allied paramilitary forces in appropriating land, is identified as the main reason why key Nuba politicians joined the SPLM/A in the first place.

The opening chapters of the book provide a comprehensive historical background to the Nuba Mountains and their peopling over many centuries; the successive phases of their incorporation into the Sudanese state from the early 20th century onwards (with the accompanying story of marginalization); and the 'land-grabbing' by state institutions, entrepreneurs, and investors that has been promoted by successive post-colonial governments. The impact of large mechanized agricultural schemes in this relatively well-watered belt of the Sahel has intensified to the point where nomadic communities are affected almost equally with settled villages. When we add in the oil factor – and most of the North's known oilfields are in South Kordofan – the perilous position of the Nuba, who have already been represented as 'facing genocide', becomes all too clear.

Land, Governance, and Conflict is one of the very few full-length studies written in recent years on the basis of detailed local knowledge and fieldwork in any part of the northern



Sudan. By extension, it also throws light on events in the other marginal regions of the northern Sudan, including Darfur, where the interests of citizens in their own traditional lands have been sacrificed to those of central government and its allies. But in particular, this book stands as an authoritative testimony to the political history, basic human integrity, and current predicaments of the Nuba people as they find themselves literally on the edge of a new crisis.

Wendy James




SSSUK

NOTICES



SUDAN STUDIES AT JUBA UNIVERSITY



On behalf of the SSSUK, John Ryle hands over a back-run of *Sudan Studies* to the University Librarian, Alfred David Lado, at the University of Juba early in 2011.

(Picture by Benedetta de Alessi)

SSSUK NOTICES

**Sudan Studies Society of the U.K.
25th Annual General Meeting and Symposium**

**Will be held
(in association with the Africa/Asia Centre of the School of
Oriental and African Studies and the Royal African Society)**

On

Saturday, 12th September 2011

In

Khalili Theatre, 09.45 to 16.50

**School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
(off Russell Square)**

**As this is the Society's 25th Annual Meeting and because of
events in Sudan, it should be a very good meeting indeed and
Members are strongly encouraged to attend if at all possible.
Interested non-Members are also welcome to attend.**

Further details on papers enclosed.

Further final details on our web-site: <http://www.sssuk.org>



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Manuscripts are not normally returned to authors, but original material such as photographs will be returned.

It is helpful to have, very briefly (2 to 3 lines), any relevant details about the author – any post held, or time recently spent in the Sudan

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